

EURATOM members. A form of chemical weapons verification system exists within the Western European Union, and the relationship between this and a verification agency with an overlapping geographic scope would have to be considered.

Another example of overlapping jurisdictions is found in the Latin American nuclear weapons free zone. The Treaty establishing this zone (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the associated verification organization (OPANAL - Organismo para la Proscripcion de las Armas Nucleares en America Latina) also differs from the Agency in its safeguards requirements (e.g., it permits challenge inspections). However, the Treaty assigns a role to the IAEA as the verifying body and in respect to challenge inspections. This sort of arrangement could be studied for possible implications for a chemical weapons verification body. It offers one model of co-ordination, or even of the adaptation of the broader agency's function and system to local conditions. As well, since the Treaty has challenge inspection provisions in which the Agency could have a role, these should be investigated more closely.

The IAEA is an autonomous agency within the United Nations system. Although it submits reports to various UN organs, and should consider resolutions relating to its activities passed by those organs, it is not subordinate to those organs in the sense of receiving instructions from them. This is a very advantageous autonomy, since it helps to insulate the Agency from outside political forces which could damage its safeguards functions. If a chemical weapons verification agency is to have some relationship to the United Nations system, the nature of the Agency's relations and their possible applicability to such a verification agency should be explored.

Some Side Benefits and Costs

The beneficial activities of an international verification body need not be restricted to the mere issuing of reports of compliance or non-compliance. The IAEA serves as well as a forum for the discussion of issues associated with safeguards and nuclear affairs.

Some benefits could derive from the existence of a forum to take up issues related to anomalies uncovered by the safeguards system. Clear violations of obligations may be unlikely; the first warnings would probably come in the form of ambiguous situations. In the process of taking up an anomaly in its safeguards reports, the IAEA may require clarifications, explanations, and possibly remedial action by the state concerned. It thus provides a mechanism for the identification and resolution of troubling cases before these progress too far or develop difficult political ramifications.