

Communications Command, for example, has about 3,500 Regulars, 2,000 reservists, and 600 civilians. The Canadian Forces Training System has over 4,500 Regular military personnel and operates more than twenty schools. Logistics support includes a very wide range of activities relating to "material acquisition, maintenance, storage, distribution and construction."

These other functions now account for more than fifty percent of the military-civilian personnel of the Department of National Defence, and for well over one third of the defence budget. The 1987 White Paper showed the number of military personnel with line commands at that time as 55,550 (10,000 Maritime, 23,050 Air and 22,500 Land -- including those in Europe), out of a total of 84,600 military and 35,500 civilians for the whole Department.

As the 1990s proceed, the government will have to make new efforts to tackle the problem of defence infrastructure if the armed forces are not to become almost all tail with little front end. The issue is a complex and politically sensitive one, as base closures in recent years have demonstrated once again. But renewed initiatives aimed at reducing support and peripheral activities to reasonable proportions will be essential in the coming period if the defence structure is not eventually to implode on itself. For example, new efforts must be made to simplify and rationalize the overly complex higher command structure -- with its five overlapping levels of authority -- and to reduce management functions accordingly. Also, the problem of far too many bases surely has to be resolved. Otherwise -- if these various economies are not made and some front line tasks in Europe or elsewhere are given up -- the Armed Forces will become massively unbalanced and increasingly unviable. That would be a prescription for disaster, since military forces must be able to produce well-armed front-line forces, in reasonable numbers, when crises arise or demands press in of one kind or another.