

security in space. The expert in this context presented various interesting technologies such as, inter alia, microwave radar imaging, which would make it possible to obtain images of satellites from a ground station with a resolution in the order of centimetres. Several other techniques were referred to, such as satellite-borne sensors; on-site inspections; infra-red devices; and the tagging of satellites, etc. An international tracking centre could be established and at its disposal have a tracking centre, as well as a world-wide network of observation stations. The delegation looked forward to continued deliberations on verifications techniques. The Ad Hoc Committee last year and during the 1990 session had advanced its work on these kind of issues, inter alia, through interesting contributions by scientific and technical experts. The contributions of experts should be as systematic and structured as possible. The delegation had, therefore, proposed that an expert group be established to assist the work of the Committee.

41. Another delegation in the presentation of its expert gave its view on new technologies for effective non-nuclear defences against strategic ballistic missiles. It stated that it would be unwise to discriminate in arms control accords in favour of nuclear defences and against non-nuclear defences. This is why this State seeks in its bilateral negotiations to facilitate the co-operative transition to increasing reliance on such defences. To facilitate this transition and openness, it has proposed the following four ideas in the Defence and Space Talks: first, a side ought not deploy large-scale defences without first engaging in three years of discussions with the other side on specific measures for a co-operative transition. In these discussions the sides could address such questions as the purpose and architectures, and planned pace and scale, of intended deployments, and confidence-building measures; second, the ABM Treaty's permissive rights for testing certain types of advanced, space-based defences should be acknowledged. In this regard this State has provided an assurance to the other side that its testing could not, by virtue of strict limits on the number of ABM test satellites, constitute a prohibited deployment of defences; third, treaty constraints on space-based ABM radars and devices which can substitute for them, which are useful for advanced defences, should be dropped; fourth, the sides should implement now a series of predictability measures that would bring greater openness and thus reduce the risk of future technological surprise.