

## CONTENTS OF No. 6, VOL. X.

Poetry:—	
Let Sleeping Dogs Lie .....	70
Editorial:—	
Prize Essay, Royal United Service Institution .....	66
England and Turkey .....	68
Dakota Territory .....	69
Heroic Conduct .....	67
Increase of the Navy .....	67
The Late General Stisted .....	68
News of the Week .....	61
Correspondence:—	
X .....	61
Selections:—	
The Vanguard Court-Martial .....	62
Opening of Parliament .....	68
Why Turkish Rule is Detested .....	69
The Russian Circular Ironclad .....	69
The Prince of Wales in India .....	70
The Times' Panegyric on a Quarter of a Century's Progress .....	71
Cameron's March Across Africa .....	72
MILITIA GENERAL ORDERS .....	61
Reviews .....	65



The Volunteer Review,  
AND  
MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE

"Unbribed, unbought, our swords we draw,  
To guard the Monarch, fence the Law."

OTTAWA, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1870.

**RESPONDENTS**—Letters addressed to either the Editor or Publisher, as well as Communications intended for publication, must, invariably, be pre-paid. Correspondents will also bear in mind that one end of the envelope should be left open, and at the corner the words "Printer's Copy" written and a two or five cent stamp (according to the weight of the communication) placed thereon will pay the postage. No communication, however, will be inserted unless the writer's name is given, not necessarily for publication, but that we may know from whom it is sent.

We have for the past nine years endeavored to furnish the Volunteer Force of Canada with a paper worthy of their support, but, we regret to say, have not met with that tangible encouragement which we confidently expected when we undertook the publication of a paper wholly devoted to their interests. We now appeal to their chivalry and ask each of our subscribers to procure another, or to a person sending us the names of four or five new subscribers and the money will be entitled to receive one copy for the year free. A little exertion on the part of our friends would materially assist us, besides extending the usefulness of the paper among the force—keeping them thoroughly posted in all the changes and improvements in the art of war so essential for a military man to know. Our ambition is to improve the *Volunteer Review* in every respect, so as to make it second to none. Will our friends help us to do it? Premiums will be given to those getting up the largest lists. The *Review* being the only military paper published in Canada, it ought to be liberally supported by the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of each Battalion.

In another page will be found three letters addressed to the Editor of *Broad Arrow* on the "Dearth of Artillery" in the British service, which we republish because the writer, under the *nom de plume* of "Swingle-tree," is evidently an experienced Artillery Officer and thoroughly understands the practical bearing of the subject he discusses, and because our own military organization labours under a similar disadvantage, we have

not enough of Field Artillery even for our present Active Force, and we have made no provision whatever for its sudden expansion.

As "Swingle-tree" says, we have trained a large amount of so called "Garrison Artillery" as infantry soldiers, but hardly one man in ten of the force has had experimental training with the obsolete 32 pounder, not to talk of the heavy guns with which forts are now armed in these days—in fact we have not got beyond infantry organization—in any case, and our trouble appears to be that "improvement," and not development, is the leading idea in the minds of our military authorities.

The present session of Parliament will no doubt enable us to know what is designed to be done relative to the future development of our military organization. It has been hinted by the press that retrenchment will be the order of the day, and that changes in the "District Staff" system are imminent, as that system was founded on the "decentralization" theory, and as it is true in practice as well as principle, we cannot contemplate anything more fatal to the interests of the active volunteer force than such a measure.

Our military organization has been founded on the principle of "defence," the main feature of which is that a sufficient force could be always concentrated on the threatened points, and this cannot be done under any other system.

We have had repeatedly to refer to the spectacle which the English "War Office" afforded during the late Fenian troubles in Ireland—how it took nearly three months to organize a flying column for service under Lord STRAIGHTEN, and how one battalion at least, had to bivouac on the beach at Portsmouth in a storm, because somebody who should countersign an order was at a ball and could not be found.

It is not the interest of this country which will be consulted in any vital change or any movement leading thereto takes place—our troops maintained in a state of efficiency is the direct pledge to the public creditors that their investments in Canada are safe—and true policy will point out the wisdom of letting well enough alone. What is wanted is not "improvement" in the revolutionary sense, but development on the tried basis of the "Militia Bill."

There can be no doubt whatever what line that development should take it—should consist of the augmentation of Field Artillery, the organization of our Engineer and Staff Corps, and the regulation of regimental commands in such a manner as to train with the present force and cost the greatest possible number of Field Officers.

Under the present depressed state of commercial and financial matters an increase of expenditure is out of the question and should be carefully avoided, but none of the plans specified involves any present outlay, nor indeed future, except the artillery; and

while the necessity for organization is imminent, that for outlay can be well postponed. In the case of the Engineer and Staff Corps no expenditure whatever need be incurred except that of printing the necessary Gazettes.

The cost of our whole force is about twenty-five cents per capita of population, and it would be certainly absurd to break up an efficient organization in order to economize on such a paltry sum.

The following article on "Tactics," as far as they relate to "Infantry Skirmishing," is copied for the benefit of our readers from *Broad Arrow* of 15th January.

It is as well to remark that *hard* and *fast* rules on this subject cannot be laid down—only general ideas inasmuch as all tactical manoeuvres must be adapted to the topography of the district over which operations are in progress.

"At the present moment, when military tactics are attracting so much general public attention throughout Europe, the following original and well considered suggestions by a staff officer of distinction, are worthy of attention, as bearing upon more than one tactical problem, in the formation of order of battle, under the altered conditions of modern warfare.

The system advocated by the officer referred to, is described as 'Memorandum on two orders of battle, for the Infantry of a Division to show a method of skirmishing.' We give the details *in extenso* :—

The Division to contain three infantry brigades, each of four battalions.

Orders of Battle.—A. One brigade skirmishing, with one brigade in line supporting, and one brigade in column as reserve.—B. Where lateral extension is required—three brigades, each with two battalions skirmishing, and each with two battalions in line supporting.

Battalions to skirmish, would form in line; at twelve paces interval, each battalion having one company, at thirty paces, in rear of the flank which is not that of *appui*.

Advancing from the halt to skirmish, three (or more) lines at intervals between files, would be formed on the following principle:

The right files of each section throughout the skirmishing brigades to march straight to the front, to be followed at 200 yards, or required interval, by the second and third files, and subsequently by the remainder, each line being allowed to divide between the files, the length of the battalion front, but to be prepared to take the proper formation, if closed.

An officer to be on each battalion flank, and with each line to prevent overlapping, and also to maintain distance and direction; and a suitable proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers to be with each portion of their companies.

The rear company to follow in slightly open order if under fire.

Assuming the strength of battalions to be 400 files the first formation would cover 1030 yards, the thinner order 1450 yards, giving respectively nine men, and five men to defend each yard.

The infantry of the division would stand;

1st. One line of their skirmishers.

2nd. At 200 yards, a moderately thick line of skirmishers.

3rd. At 200 yards, a dense line of skirmishers.