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## The Volunteer Review,

AND

## MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE

"Unbribed, unbought, our swords we draw,  
To guard the Monarch, fence the Law."

OTTAWA, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1875.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.—Letters addressed to either the Editor or Publisher, as well as Communications intended for publication, must, invariably, be pre-paid. Correspondents will also bear in mind that one end of the envelope should be left open, and at the corner the words "Printer's Copy" written and a two or five cent stamp (according to the weight of the communication) placed thereon will pay the postage.

LIEUT. J. B. VINTER, of Victoria, and Captain H. V. EDMONDS of New Westminster, are our authorized Agents for British Columbia.

On and after the 1st October we have to pay the postage on the VOLUNTEER REVIEW, instead of our subscribers; hence the necessity of imperatively insisting on all subscribers in arrears of immediately paying up. If this is not strictly complied with—the paper will be stopped and the accounts placed in the hands of an Attorney for collection. It is not our intention to add to the subscription price of the VOLUNTEER REVIEW, in consequence of our now having to pay the postage thereon; but we do look for a large increase of subscribers to our list, and call upon all our friends in the several Provinces to use their efforts in this respect. Premiums will be offered to those getting up the largest lists. The Review being the only military paper published in the Dominion of Canada it ought to be liberally supported by the officers, non commissioned officers, and men of each Battalion.

The United States Army and Navy Journal of 10th July, has an article on "Diet Tables for the Army," which we republish in order that our medical and commissariat departments may profit by the extensive experience of the corresponding departments in the service of our neighbours.

In the same number a letter appears illustrating "what a pleasant pastime war is,"

by "General McPherson's fate," which is republished for the information it will give our younger officers of the many disagreeable incidents connected with a military life on active service, and how necessary it is to cultivate that command of thought and action, known as presence of mind, in the discharge of a soldier's duty.

The gallant soldier to whose lot it fell to be an actor in this melancholy tragedy, and who narrates the whole scene so graphically and naturally, while doing his duty strictly, should have instructed his marksmen to shoot the General's horse, according to his own shewing, every one could have been attained by making him prisoner—and that it could be effected as easily as killing him is perfectly obvious—while a valuable and useful life would be saved to his country.

We have to thank the energetic and efficient Librarian of the Royal United Service Institution T. D. SULLIVAN, Esq., for a copy of a pamphlet published by Loxmans, Green & Co., London, entitled—"Unarmoured Ships," by THOMAS BRASSEY, M.P.

The opening sentence of this valuable essay enunciates an axiom which should obtain general publicity. It says:—"The duties and services which vessels of war are required to perform are so various in their nature that it is altogether impossible that the same classes of ships can be advantageously employed both in line of battle and for the police of the seas." And as the consideration of the types of ships best adapted for the protection of Commerce forms the subject of the treatise, it is deduced as a corollary of the proposition involved in the foregoing axiom that speed, tonnage, capacity, and adaptability to the mechanical powers of wind or steam renders it impossible that the effective ocean cruiser can be an armoured vessel.

Mr. BRASSEY has succeeded in demonstrating beyond the possibility of doubt that a return to wooden frigates with auxiliary steam power is one of the conditions, and the principle one by which Britain can maintain her naval supremacy—and curiously enough illustrates her present preponderance in heavy guns and ironclads by the avowals of her rivals as to the course which they would pursue in the event of war.

First he quotes the statement of the French Baron GRIVEL as to the impossibility of contending with the "20,000 guns of our fighting Navy," and the policy which the naval force of that country should pursue would be to carry on for an indefinite period a "privateering war" against the 50,000 merchant ships of Great Britain.

As the French fleet is largely, or altogether composed of ironclads of the ROCHAMBEAU and Dunderberg class which can make on an average eight miles an hour with a fearful expenditure of fuel, and as the privateering operations as a consequence should be carried on principally in the chops of the chan-

nel under the muzzles of those 20,000 guns, England has no need to dread that alternative.

But the next illustration is far more amusing—being nothing less than the evidence of Admiral PORTER of the United States Navy before a Committee of Congress in 1872, in what that power with its efficient naval force represented by a heap of scrap iron at League Island could do in the event of war—he had been asked the following question:—"I understand you to say that if at the commencement of the late war we had had thirty steamers like those running to New York from Europe they would have been as efficient as our entire Navy." He replied—"Twice as efficient; I say without hesitation—the ships we had could catch nothing. We never had a vessel that could run down a blockade runner during the whole war except the Vanderbilt and two others. Our ironclads are only suitable for harbour defence. In case of war with Great Britain or France our powers would be exerted in cutting up their Commerce. Great Britain could not stand a war six months with the fleet of ships we could send out after her vessels. They would break her up root and branch, and that kind of warfare would be more likely to bring about peace than fighting with iron clads or heavy war vessels."

As a specimen of the *Reductio ad absurdum* the above is about the richest on record—with a fleet of 600 vessels practically proved to be unequal to the protection of their own Commerce from the depredations extending over four years of an ordinary passenger steamer carrying two heavy guns. This officer who has had plenty of practical experience and ought to have been able to make the necessary deductions therefrom, gives it as his professional opinion that his country could enter into a contest with the power in whose ports the aforesaid passenger steamers was built, backed by 20,000 guns, and the aid of over 400 steamers any thirty of which he shewed would be equal to the whole fleet of the United States.

Why the ALLAN line of steamers belonging to Canada would be more than equal, according to the opinions of this practical seaman, to the whole naval force the United States could muster; and yet he coolly proposes to cut up root and branch a Commerce employing 50,000 vessels; Verily the force of national and personal *dilatation* can go no further.

From this it would appear that the very best means to cover a decided failure is to boast of a prospective impossible success—but the people and commerce of Great Britain will remain unmolested by any possible enemies as long as they have only theorists like the Baron GRIVEL or practical professional seamen like Admiral PORTER to deal with. It is not necessary to follow Mr. BRASSEY through all the practical details of his essay—he has proved what we have always held that a return to wooden vessels would be