

be, that a man with intemperate habits ought to be stricken from the rolls of any army. If the officers of a regiment are gentlemen in the true sense of the word, sober and courteous, there will be no trouble to enforce temperance in the command; but if officers get drunk in public, the men will follow when they get a chance. A truly temperate man is a tower of strength to a regiment. Not an austere total abstinence fanatic. Such a man does more harm than good. But a true gentleman, by example and precept, will raise the character of his officers by unconscious steps, and prevent disorder, instead of vainly trying to stem it after it has risen to its full height.

MORAL DISCIPLINE.

If our cavalry of the future are fortunate enough to get such colonels, their regiments will gain proportionate reputations, not only in camp, but in the field. Well-ordered regiments always fight well. Oliver Cromwell's Ironsides, Gardiner's dragoons in English history, Havelock's "saints," Mahomet's army of so-called fanatics, the Swiss infantry in their wonderful success over the Austrian gendarmierie, all are instances of the resistless power of sober, religious men, banded together by moral discipline. Each corps have won the greatest successes of ancient and modern times, in all cases.

I cannot recall an instance in history, in which one army prayed before going into battle, and the other feasted, where the feasters were not overthrown; and the battles in which such was the state of affairs are innumerable.

Moral force is an engine that has never been rated at its true value in war. When over it has been tried it has proved to have been all-powerful. It is the basis of all rigid and effectual discipline. Martineau has always proved a failure in the end. Its spirit is totally opposite, and only drives men to mutiny. But moral discipline convinces men that a certain thing is right; and under that thought they will submit to restrictions and regulations that from a martinet would be utterly intolerable.

The best disciplined regiments are those that have the least number of punishments. An officer who cannot control his men without brutality, is unfit to be an officer. But natural disciplinarians are very rare, and experience is a slow school; some men never learn anything in it.

(To be continued.)

RELATIONS WITH CANADA.

(From the Chicago Tribune.)

There have been, from time to time, various propositions by which improved water communication might be established between Chicago and the St. Lawrence River. There have been various canals projected by which the falls of Niagara and the rapids of the St. Lawrence might be avoided, but the end sought by all these improvements is the same,—a free, uninterrupted water course for the largest steam and sail vessels from the upper lakes to Montreal.

The most feasible, cheapest, and speediest improvements to accomplish this result is the enlargement of the Welland and the St. Lawrence Canals. This can be done by the Dominion Government, at an expense, all told, not exceeding \$4,500,000. At present the Canadian Provinces enjoy a decided advantage over the Western States of the United States. With their line of semi-weekly or tri-weekly steamers, to Europe, they have the Liverpool market, less the

ocean freights, at their door. As ocean freights from Montreal are the same as from New York, the Canadians have the advantage over us that is represented by the freights from Chicago to New York, Philadelphia, or Baltimore. The cost of moving a bushel of wheat from Chicago to the Liverpool steamer in New York is not less than 35 cents, and of a barrel of flour, \$1 20. With the water route open to Montreal, the freight from Chicago to the Montreal steamer would not exceed 18 cents on the grain, or 50 cents on the barrel of flour. The difference would be added to the price of the article in the hands of the producer. It now costs one bushel of grain to pay the freight on itself and another bushel from the place of growth in Iowa to the New York steamer. By the water route to Montreal, one bushel of grain would pay the cost of moving itself and two other bushels to the steamer. But the advantages and direct benefits of having an Atlantic market, to which we could ship breadstuffs, without breaking bulk, are too self-evident to need discussion. They are not questioned or disputed in any quarter.

If the Canadian canals were enlarged, most of the foreign trade of the Western States would be transacted through Montreal. The saving in time, freight, handling, inspection, and commissions, would be so great that no person would waste his property for the mere sake of sending it by another route. Canada has the means and the disposition to make these improvements. But Canada is also seriously land locked by the territory of the United States, and some portions of her possessions are even more remote from market than our own. The maritime provinces are much nearer, for purposes of trade, to New England, Pennsylvania and New York, than they are to Ontario, and these Provinces are no more interested in the enlargement of the Welland Canal than they are in the removal of the Red River left of Arkansas. Nevertheless, they must bear their share in whatever expense the Dominion Government may incur in opening the enlarged navigation from the lakes to Montreal. The American people stand greatly in need of the privilege of fishing in the British American waters. Whatever opportunities we have had for profitable fishing in those waters, we have owed to the concessions of the British and Canadian Governments. We have no right to fish within three miles of shore, nor to land for the purpose of curing or drying fish, and without these privileges our fisheries are unprofitable.

We want steam navigation from the Western lakes to Montreal, thereby reducing freights from 25 to 40 per cent on all our exports of breadstuffs. We want the free use of the fisheries in common with our Canadian brethren. These great boons the Canadians are willing to give us, provided that in return we will permit them to exchange their domestic products, of which we stand in need of, for those of our products which they want to purchase. Shall we permit New Brunswick to sell potatoes to Massachusetts, and Nova Scotia to supply the factories of New England with coal, and the people of Prince Edward's Island to exchange their products, and those of Ontario and Quebec to furnish us with lumber for our prairies, ties for our railroads, and to supply the local frontier with butter, eggs, poultry, and other commodities in exchange for our products? If they are to throw open their fisheries and tax themselves to the extent of some millions of dollars, to enable American steamers to extend their commerce to Montreal, and thus secure an Eastern port

whence to export the surplus of the West, they ask a reciprocity that will admit Canadian vessels with their cargoes of coal, codfish, lumber, potatoes, barley, and other local products to our markets, there to be exchanged for such articles as we may have to sell them. It is a remarkable fact that we are at this time complaining to the civilized world that the British will not permit our fishermen to catch fish in the bays, inlets, harbors, and waters of the British possessions, nor to land on British soil, and there cure, dry, and pack the fish, when we virtually exclude all fish caught in these same waters by British fishermen from being sold in the United States. We have prohibited the sale, in the United States, of fish caught by the British in their own waters, and think it unreasonable that the British should object to our fishing in those same waters, and carrying the fish so caught into British ports, to be dried and cured for our market.

If the contracting parties of the two Governments will stipulate that the Welland and St. Lawrence Canals shall be enlarged to the capacity of steam navigation, and will open the British American fisheries to our people on an equality with their own, we insist that they will be entitled to a liberal treaty for reciprocal trade and commerce, and that the productions of Canada and the United States shall be exchangeable free of all duties and imposts. Such a treaty, we know, will be of valuable to Canada, but it will be doubly so to us. We want lumber, and, if the only thing we received from Canada was lumber, we should reap a profit by the exchange far exceeding any loss, if loss were possible, on other articles.

A NEW OBJECTION TO THE LARGE WAR INDEMNITY.

[From the London Spectator, March 4.]

We trust that the House of Commons will not separate for the holidays without one serious discussion upon the new misery which the German statesmen have added to the miseries of mankind, without one protest against the establishment of a precedent which, if followed, will make the industry of the world the treasure chest of the German army. What does Mr. Gladstone, first of financiers and economists, think of the fiction of a national debt of £400,000,000 sterling as a fine upon a first-class power; of the recurrence to the exploded system of tribute; of tribute exacted from a single power to the extent of £12,000,000 a year—an income tax of a shilling in the pound to be paid by France forever to enrich a foreign State? The Germans demand £200,000,000 sterling in cash, or its equivalents, payable within three years; and as France is powerless, and the money not absolutely beyond the range of possible collection, Germany must have it; but just see what the exaction means. It means, if the money is taken in rentes, a payment of a thousand millions per centum by France to the German army Nations do not die, and as the money must be borrowed, its interest will be payable by unborn generations; or if it is taken in cash, it means that the single effectual restraint upon the ambition of Generals, the pecuniary difficulties entailed by war, is as far as Germany is concerned, removed forever.

The danger to Europe from this indemnity seems to us grave, but, of course, it is less than the danger to France herself. The money can be procured, we believe, and procured within two years, partly by borrowing on the credit of the State, and partly by straining the resources of the cities and com-