

it "The Mortmain Act." However that may be colloquially, that is not its official designation, and it may be a question whether 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, is included in the statutes known as the "Statutes of Mortmain or of Charitable Uses" referred to in R.S.O. c. 112, s. 8. If it should be held not to be included, then, of course, the decisions *In re Brown* and *Manning v. Robinson*, supra, would be erroneous. If it is, then in Ontario, as in England, all former decisions as to gifts of impure personality for charitable uses are virtually superseded. R.S.O. c. 112, s. 4, may possibly be thought to empower lands to be devised to corporations not authorized to hold lands in mortmain, but according to Mr. Bristowe's comment on the English Act, 54 & 55 Vict., c. 73, from which it is derived, the Act has not that effect. To conclude, we have at present an Act (9 Geo. 2, c. 36) forbidding the proceeds of land or impure personality being devised for charitable uses, and then we have a section of R.S.O. c. 112, in effect declaring that impure personality shall not be deemed within "the statutes of mortmain," but whether 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, comes within that definition is a matter not free from doubt. In addition we have a part of the law on this subject governed by Imperial statutes which have been made law here, and part by our own statutes, and it is needless to say that the time has arrived when the whole statute law on the subject should be brought within the compass of one Act.

THE TICKET OF LEAVE ACT.

In the recent Quebec case of *Regina v. Johnson*, Ouimet, J., places an interpretation upon certain provisions of the Dominion Ticket of Leave Act (62 & 63 Vict., c. 49) which, if generally adopted by the courts of this country, must have an important bearing upon the policy of the Crown in issuing licenses to convicts under the Act as it stands.

The facts upon which the case proceeded are briefly these: On the third day of January, 1896, Johnson, the convict, had been sentenced by the Court of Queen's Bench to undergo a five years' term of imprisonment for a certain offence. On the eighth day of March, 1900, while serving his term of imprisonment under such sentence, he was liberated by virtue of a license in writing issued by the Governor-General under the provisions of the first section of the Act above referred to. On the ninth of July following the