

the Bay of Chaleurs, up which transports of 200 tons' burthen can ascend as high as Campbell Town.

The Temiscouata Road could not, indeed, be depended upon in time of war; it would belong to the strongest on its border. If the Metis Road be required, it must be nearly re-opened, at a cost of nearly 30,000*l*.

It has been suggested that an enemy crossing the St. John's River from Fort Jarvis on the Fish River, might turn our post at the Temiscouata Lake, and advance to the St. Lawrence, after dispossessing us of the disputed Territory, and establish himself on that river near the Traverse, and impede its navigation.

This latter attempt does not appear to me probable, but they may attempt to drive us from the valley of the St. John's River, and that part of the disputed Territory held by us. If this be worth contesting posts must be established on the St. John's, opposite to Fort Jarvis, at the little falls of the Madawaska, and at the great falls on the St. John's.

These form no part of the works recommended for the defence of Canada.

The distance between Quebec and the Rivière du Loup (114 miles) can be traversed by artillery in forty-eight hours, with relays of horses in winter.

In order to assist my attempt to describe the Canadian Frontier, I propose to divide it into four districts, which measure would in reality, I think, facilitate arrangements for its defence in time of war.

1. I propose calling the first the Quebec District, extending from the Rivière du Loup, to the mouth of the Yamaska River, at its confluence with the St. Lawrence.

2. The 2nd district (or Montreal) extending from the Yamaska to the mouth of the ~~Front~~ River in Lake Ontario. *Front*

3. The 3rd (or Niagara District) from the ~~Front~~ River to the mouth of the Ouse, or Grand River in Lake Erie.

4. The 4th (or Western District) comprehends the remainder of the water-bound Frontier, between the Grand River and Lake Huron.

At the present time this extensive line of frontier (nearly 1400 miles) remains without the protection of the works recommended for that purpose. "Nothing has been done (as remarked in the same paragraph of the Ordinance Minute before quoted) towards the works recommended by the Commission of 1825, except at Quebec and Kingston, which are incomplete."

An enemy can consequently attack us when, where, and how it may suit his convenience and views. Our system of defence must be passive and local. We are precluded from acting upon the principles of a sound defensive system, and from deriving advantage from the energy and discipline of our troops: from the risks attendant on leaving one vulnerable point whilst concentrating, in order to repel an attack, at another, or acting ourselves upon the offensive.

Under present circumstances we must regulate our movements by those of an enemy, which may not be ascertained until it be too late to counteract them.

Having offered these general observations, I will proceed with the outline of the frontier. The Commanding Royal Engineer is in correspondence with this department upon the completion of the fortress at Quebec. With regard to the frontier line of this district, it is deemed almost impervious to an enemy in force having a siege in view; the country is well calculated for defence, and he must bring his heavy artillery and materials for a siege, and even for crossing the St. Lawrence from Lake Champlain, and if we retain possession of the Richelieu River, he would be exposed to attack on his flank, and to have his communications with his own country interrupted.

I consider, then, the Frontier of Montreal must be taken from us before an enemy could pass the St. Lawrence below Montreal to besiege Quebec.

It will be prudent, however, to have advanced strong posts in the direction of the Kennebec and Penobscot Rivers, and at Sherbrooke, on the St. Francis, as a rallying point and depôt for the militia.

Arnold's march by the Kennebec and Chaudière rivers to Quebec, can only be looked upon as a bold incursion, dependent upon Montgomery's success at Montreal.