

C 117805

the United Kingdom and Europe and sections of our own people will be only too eager to seek an alibi and throw the blame on Canada for breaking the front.

- (c) Third possibility - to accept the decision of the majority, that is, England and France, which will probably be against present action on oil; making no statement unless their position has been made clear.

If their vote is for sanctions, it might be considered that by supporting it we were running the risk of aiding in bringing on war, but it seems unlikely, as indicated above, that they will vote for <sup>further</sup> sanctions unless persuaded they won't mean war. We have already taken some risk by agreeing in October to support certain economic sanctions; the difficulty about economic sanctions is that if mild they may be useless, and if effective they may bring on war. Stanley Baldwin said in May, 1934: "There is no such thing as a sanction that will work and does not mean war".

If this were the Government's conclusion, it would not appear necessary to make any statement except in the case of oil sanctions being moved and being accepted by us, in which case Riddell could simply say Canada was prepared to join with the other members of the League in this course. If further sanctions are not proposed, we might make a statement to the effect that Canada would have been prepared to support them if the United States (or the United Kingdom) had done so, but aside from "passing the buck", such a statement under these conditions would not be accepted as genuine.

OD.  
Feb 27/36

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1933-1939  
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