

it was not the intention of the Unified Command to pursue the North Korean forces right up to the Manchurian border. We had reason to believe that a defensive line could be established across the narrow waist of North Korea, and that the two northern provinces of Korea would be left, for the time being at least, as a kind of unoccupied frontier area. That scheme seemed sensible to us, and we hoped it could be carried out.

With many other delegations, including indeed the delegation of the United States of America, we felt that very great care should be taken to avoid offering any unnecessary provocation to the Chinese government at Peking. At the same time we realized, on this and on other occasions, that the Unified Command was responsible for the operations of a force which was very largely composed of soldiers of the United States. That command and those soldiers were bearing the brunt of the responsibility and of the fighting, and they had the full right to make the military decisions within the limits of the authority given them by the United Nations. When those decisions turned out well, we all rejoiced with them. When they were wrong, I think it would have been improper and ungrateful to be unfairly critical and emphasize our own lack of responsibility. However, all of us who supported the action of the United Nations in Korea had not only the right but the duty to make our views known to the Unified Command through the positions we took at Lake Success, and also through our contacts with the United States delegation there.

In this connection it will be recalled that on October 5 last the foreign minister of the Chinese People's Government, Mr. Chou En-lai, stated that his government would not stand aside if the United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel.

That warning came to us through the Indian ambassador at Peking. We ourselves did not think it a sufficient reason for refusing the United Nations commander permission to complete the task which had been assigned to him; but many delegations, including our own, considered it to be a good reason for conducting military operations in North Korea, with, shall I say, great circumspection. So when we began to receive indications that it was intended to carry the campaign to the Yalu river, we expressed our misgivings confidentially to the United States authorities in Washington as early as November 6. It may also be recalled that I publicly made clear the position of the government on this matter when I spoke in Windsor on November 15. On that occasion, after stating that the marches where the free world rubbed together with the Soviet world were obviously the most critical points, I went on to voice this hope:

Those primarily responsible for safeguarding the security of such areas of the world should carry out their mission in as steady and unprovocative a way as possible.

In keeping with this point of view we supported, in private discussions at the United Nations, the proposal that a buffer state should be left along the northern boundary of Korea in order to avoid giving any