

and, indeed, to the suspicion and sensitiveness of its peoples. Likewise, in the field of political security, the conditions for a Pacific security pact - on the model of the Atlantic Pact - do not exist. We must, therefore, be wary of coming too easily to the conclusion that arrangements which have proved their effectiveness in one part of the world can be readily adapted to meet the needs of another. There are undoubtedly basic differences which we cannot ignore between the present situation in the East and that in the West, in so far as a collective security pact is concerned. In the North Atlantic we had a true community of nations with long standing economic, political and cultural ties between them, similar political systems, and a demonstrable collective capacity to contribute to the common defence. We had an easily definable geographical area, on which it was in our collective interest to forbid an aggressor to trespass. Not all of these fundamentals are present in Asia, thus making the problems of regional defence and collective security in that area infinitely more difficult. There is the question too of whether a requisite number of Asian nations - all of whom have pressing internal problems to solve - would be willing to support such a Pact. There has grown up among the new nation states of Asia a distinctive point of view which manifests their desire to settle their own problems, including their security problems, in their own way. This view is particularly strong in India and Indonesia and it is one which we should respect. In my view, a Pacific Security Pact at this time, which would include Asian and non-Asian countries, of varying degrees of stability and development, and without the ties that link the states of the Atlantic community, would be an uneasy and artificial creation, without strong foundations. Certain of the governments chiefly concerned - including the British, Indian, American and Canadian - have felt that it was premature at this stage to attempt such a Pact along the lines of that which is now the foundation for the increasingly close association of the North Atlantic community. But this certainly does not mean that Canada recognizes no obligations regarding collective security in the Pacific - or has no security interest in that area. Korea - and our participation in United Nations action there - proves the contrary. It shows that we have very definite obligations in respect of the peace of the Pacific and that it is our interest, and our duty, to carry out those obligations. Indeed, it is significant that, while our general responsibility under the United Nations Charter has been reinforced in the Atlantic area by the specific obligations of a precise treaty, nevertheless, the area of the world where we have first been asked to support the United Nations by force, has been the Pacific, in Korea.

We will not, I think, fully understand the significance of United Nations action in Korea - nor will we be able to make that action effective and beneficial - for Korea and beyond Korea - unless we of the Western democracies realize something of the forces that have been working in Asia over the years.

These forces have been moving, irresistibly, towards two objectives - national freedom and human welfare. Japanese aggression jarred and loosened the foundations of the old colonial structures in Asia. The slogans of "Asia for the Asiatics" and a "Co-prosperity Sphere in East Asia", though merely cloaks for Japanese domination and exploitation, had a wide propaganda appeal, just as communist slogans have in Asia now. The masses of Asia were sufficiently disillusioned by the old order to be ready to try something new. What did they have to lose? A crust of bread and a precarious hold on life. The inevitability of gradual development made little appeal to them against revolutionary proposals. So, ready or not, they demanded immediate national independence. Their aspirations have been substantially met.