

verification system, the existence of a credible compliance system can be an incentive to states to join a treaty (although in a small number of cases it may be a disincentive).

Multilateral WMD verification is currently better governed, organized, funded and supported by the requisite technical and technological means than ever before. Enormous advances have been made since 1972, when the NPT, the first major multilateral WMD treaty with a matching verification system, entered into force. Compliance mechanisms for multilateral WMD regimes, in contrast, are underdeveloped, untested and subject to doubt and confusion. There remains much work to be done to clarify how non-compliance cases should be dealt with and to broaden the range of incentives and disincentives that may be employed to bring a recalcitrant state back into compliance.

### **The regimes**

Multilateral WMD verification today is a substantial international enterprise. Recurrent annual expenditure on multilateral verification currently totals more than \$300 million. More than 3,000 people are employed by international verification bodies, not counting the hundreds more employed by national implementing authorities and regional organizations. The number of full-time arms control/disarmament inspectors employed by multilateral agencies exceeds 700, while a further 380 are on UNMOVIC's roster (in addition to a notional number on the roster of the UN Secretary-General for CBW use investigations).

The great lacuna here is BW: attempts to provide the BWC with a verification agency have failed utterly. Only UNMOVIC has anything approaching what would be needed for BW and it is mandated only to deal with Iraq, while the UN Secretary-General's mechanism is hyper-virtual. Without strong US support and advocacy there is currently no prospect of this situation changing dramatically despite the earnest discussion among BWC states parties.

### **Governance and organization**

Much has been learned by now about the organizational structures required for effective verification, especially when a comprehensive system is envisaged. There is now a standard model of a conference of states parties, an executive body and a technical secretariat, including where necessary a standing inspectorate. International verification organizations still, however, rarely adopt best management practices, as used in business or in the more effective national governments. There would appear to be no a priori reason why the highest managerial standards—including those relating to finance and human resources—should not be expected of our verification systems. International security is too important to be waylaid by distracting organizational problems that have ready solutions.

### **Funding**

The question of the funding of verification is perennially fraught. While no one expects verification systems to be given a blank cheque, verification cannot be expected to be done on the cheap lest it discredit the whole enterprise. All of the multilateral verification organizations are experiencing funding challenges as more effective and intrusive verification is demanded of them and