

We should not try to throw all the blame on France and General de Gaulle for recent NATO developments. Some of General de Gaulle's decisions, I know, have been disconcerting and seem to indicate a return to a kind of nationalism from which France has suffered as much in the last 50 years as any country in the world. Before we condemn, however, we should try to understand what is behind France's recent actions. France is not, has not been, and will not be, satisfied with an Atlantic organization, or an Atlantic alliance of independent states, dominated by America. France (and not only France) feels that continental Europe is now strong enough (in large part because of the generous assistance of the U.S.A.) to be given its rightful share in the control of the policies of the alliance.

While France is not alone in this feeling, only de Gaulle has translated it into policy and action. If he has gone too far in that action (as I think he has), if he is on the wrong course, we should not drive him farther in the wrong direction but try to bring him back to the right course by seriously re-examining the purposes and the organization of NATO in the light of 1966, not 1948. As I have said, we should have done it years ago. If the reason for General de Gaulle's action is his belief that the other allies will not consider any change to NATO to meet new conditions, let's take positive action about the necessary reforms. Surely it doesn't make sense any longer to take the position that NATO is sacrosanct and mustn't be altered. Our reaction should be just the opposite.

In short, to rail at General de Gaulle, because he is demanding, for France, a position in the Atlantic alliance equal to that of Britain and somewhat closer to that of the U.S.A. is to show a dangerous misunderstanding of the situation.

May I refer on this point to some observations in Max Frankel's penetrating article "Our Friends the French" in the April number of *Freedom and Union*? Mr. Frankel is somewhat critical of his own country's share in the responsibility for NATO, as he puts it, "becoming an anachronism whose defensive or military purposes were long ago overtaken by technological change and whose diplomatic purposes we have never managed to define or construct". He believes that not de Gaulle's stubbornness but a long chain of events and conflicting governmental policies - including those of the United States - have caused the disarray.

I do not see the Atlantic nations going forward together to a secure and hopeful future without France. Therefore, we must find a way out of our present NATO difficulties so that France can fully participate in the march to greater, not less, Atlantic unity. We must not give up the ultimate vision of closer Atlantic unity just because some clouds are obscuring the immediate future of NATO.

Indeed, a new move forward to realize the greater vision may help remove some of the nearer clouds.

VISION OF THE FUTURE

We must now look at the picture ahead of us with the courage and imagination we showed 17 years ago,

when the NATO pact was signed. Taking this same cradle area of the Atlantic nations, we must ask ourselves what sort of "Atlantica" we should like our children to inherit from us in five years, ten years, 20 years? What sort of vision of the future can we hold up as a rallying-point, as an objective of policy - without pretending that it must turn out the way we wish but convinced in our own minds that, given goodwill, dedicated hard work, and a certain amount of good luck, it could be that way?

This forward march must be Atlantic, and not merely European or North American. But it must provide for more control by Europe of its direction and its character - a Europe, moreover, that would include Britain....

There are those who worry about the "separateness" of such a European development and who would, therefore, prefer to concentrate now on the federal union of all the Atlantic people, even at the expense of earlier European union. If we are realistic, however, we may have to accept at this time the more practical immediate objective of a united Europe, not as an obstacle to, but as a stage on the way to Atlantic union.

If we cannot at present achieve a pattern of Atlantic federalism, it may be necessary to acknowledge the realities of the situation and, as North Americans, work with Europeans in the hope that, in the longer sweep of history, both European and North America will come to realize that their respective affairs can best be harmonized in a wider union. If an intervening European stage is necessary, however, it must be taken not in continental isolation but in close Atlantic co-operation and understanding.

As I try to grope my own way towards a conception that would make sense for North America, and for both Western and even Eastern Europe, I am convinced that we cannot insist on retaining NATO in its present form as the only foundation for building a more genuinely international structure more appropriate for the future. I am equally sure that continentalism either of the European or North American variety is not the answer.

U.S. MUST LEAD

Finally, I believe that only the United States can give the effective lead required for Atlantic unity. Without its active participation and support, nothing can be done, at least on the broad front which is essential. Without its leadership we shall be driven back to a national or continental solution for the organization of security and for progress.

So we in other countries should be heartened by the fact that 111 Senators and Congressmen, from 34 states and from both parties, have co-sponsored or supported the resolution on Atlantic unity, along with ex-Presidents, former Presidential candidates and Governors. The list includes two names that mean much to all free citizens throughout the world - President Truman and President Eisenhower.

With this kind of backing, with this kind of understanding and vision, who dares not take this initiative seriously?....