

(Mr. Fields, United States)

We note, however, that the approach proposed by the Soviet Union is quite different. As my delegation understands it, no information on the locations of either stocks or facilities would be provided until just before their destruction. In the case of stocks, the location declared would be adjacent to a destruction facility, whose location would already be known. Thus, no meaningful information about the location of stocks would be given. In the case of production facilities, under the Soviet approach no information on locations would be made available for the first eight years of the convention.

This approach makes sense only if one assumes that verification would be solely the responsibility of the State possessing stocks and facilities — in other words, that the only means of verification would be self-inspection. No one, however, is proposing such an absurd system.

Even the Soviet Union has proposed that national technical means of verification and challenge inspection be key aspects of the verification system for monitoring stocks and facilities. Therefore, the Soviet position regarding the declaration of stocks and facilities and the verification of this declaration appears to be internally inconsistent. How, for example, can one use national technical means to confirm that production facilities are inactive if their locations are unknown? How can one tell if a State is attempting to hide stocks if it refuses to reveal the location of those that have been "declared"? If the location of each chemical-weapon stockpile and production facility is not separately specified, it would be impossible to know whether any particular stockpile or production facility had been included in a party's declaration. Without declaration of locations, neither national technical means nor challenge inspection would have any utility in verifying the completeness or accuracy of a party's declaration.

Nor do the reasons given to justify unwillingness to declare locations hold up under close examination. It has been argued that the declaration of locations of stocks will reveal the location of front-line military units and make the stocks vulnerable to attack in the event of war. It is highly unlikely that a prudent military command would store the bulk of its chemical weapons with front-line units. Most of the stocks would normally be in regional and central depots. Furthermore, considerable information is already available about the location and identity of front-line units. Moreover, in the event of war, all ammunition storage sites are subject to attack, whether or not they have been specifically identified as chemical-weapon storage sites.

In developing its position on declarations, the United States carefully conducted an analysis of the military implications of declaring the locations of chemical-weapon stockpiles and production facilities. My Government reached a conclusion diametrically opposed to that put forward by the Soviet Union. In the United States view, the benefits of assuring an effective convention far outweigh any military risks flowing from the disclosure of locations. The fact that the Soviet Union apparently considers the military risks of disclosure to be very high suggests that chemical weapons play a much larger role in Soviet military plans than in Western plans.

For all of the above reasons, the Soviet approach is simply not realistic. Only if locations of stocks and production facilities are declared promptly, as proposed by the United States, can a practical and effective verification system be put in place to provide the necessary confidence in compliance. Would any Government rest its security on anything less?