

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

The Soviet delegation has not responded to major Western initiatives that have been before this Conference for a year or more. What is the Soviet response to the proposals made by the United Kingdom for ensuring non-production of chemical weapons? We do not know, although the basic approach was first presented two years ago. What is the Soviet response to the United States draft convention presented a year ago? It is whispered in the corridors that the Soviet delegation intends to ignore the United States draft. So it seems, but this can hardly be called negotiation.

The Soviet delegation has responded to the United States proposal for "open invitation" challenge inspection. But not constructively. Those who choose to criticize have a responsibility to present an equally effective alternative. But the Soviet delegation has not done so. Furthermore, it has rejected or ignored United States efforts to meet Soviet concerns and continues to misrepresent the United States proposal for propaganda purposes.

What my delegation is looking for is a problem-solving approach by our Soviet negotiating partners -- for evidence of a commitment to try to work out mutually-acceptable solutions that accommodate our concerns. The delegation of the Soviet Union would find that such a commitment to co-operation would be fully reciprocated.

This is no empty promise. My delegation is prepared to match words with deeds. Let me give some specific examples.

The United States delegation has explained in detail the reasons why the locations of chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities must be declared promptly for the convention to be effective. In an effort to meet the concerns expressed by the Soviet Union, the United States is willing to consider the possibility that a party could move its chemical weapons stocks before declaration from their original storage sites in combat units to regional depots.

Since only the regional depots -- and not the combat units -- would contain chemical weapons, only the locations of these depots would have to be declared. Thus, the locations of combat units would not be revealed. The locations of depots would be declared within 30 days after the convention enters into force for the State.

As a second example, with respect to destruction of chemical weapons, the Soviet delegation has insisted that a party be allowed to divert some chemicals to industrial uses. My delegation has not been in favour of this concept. The Soviet delegation has not made clear what would be diverted nor how the peaceful use of the chemical would be verified. However, in an effort to meet the concerns expressed by the Soviet Union, the United States is willing to explore in detail whether a mutually-acceptable solution can be developed which would permit diversion under effective verification.

As a third example, the issue of how to identify so-called "key precursors" has consumed considerable amounts of time and energy. The Soviet position has been that "objective criteria" must be agreed to before lists can be developed. My delegation and others have questioned whether criteria could be established