

provisions; and, failing that, (3) provide timely detection of the infractions. To these ends, the tasks are to validate the baseline data, monitor reductions and confirm compliance with the treaty after reductions. On-site inspections are to be used in part to perform these tasks. At declared sites, inspections can be requested on short notice with no right of refusal. Quotas would be set, expressed in terms of the number of days each participant must permit inspection teams on its territory. The intensity of inspections would be greater in the first months of the treaty in order to validate the baseline data; during this period, the armed forces of the participants would not be required to stand-down. The inspector has the right to determine the sites visited and the number of days spent on the inspected state's territory. However, the time spent at any one site would be limited, as would be the number of teams accepted on the inspected state's territory at any given time.

At non-declared sites, the inspected state has the right of delay and ultimate refusal of a request. Again, inspections are to be limited by quota.

The second task involves monitoring the destruction of equipment and the withdrawal of Soviet and American personnel. Equipment in excess of treaty limits is to be destroyed according to an agreed timetable, with prior notification and on-site inspection without quotas or right of refusal. Similarly, timetable and monitoring provisions are to be arranged for American and Soviet troop withdrawals.

In addition to on-site inspections, provision would be made for aerial inspection and the use of National and Multinational Technical Means. "Tagging" of combat aircraft and combat helicopters was also a possibility the Alliance felt deserved further study.

Other measures included the creation of a joint consultative group, and general considerations regarding inspection rights, the composition of inspection teams, the transfer of unused quotas and limits to inspections accepted from the same participant. While details in many instances were deferred to later negotiation, this document represented significant progress toward a comprehensive CFE verification regime.

At the close of the third round on 19 October, the WTO tabled two working papers on stabilization, information exchange and verification measures.<sup>31</sup> The proposals for the data exchange differed from the Western position in only three respects. First, the WTO suggested data be provided for land, air and air defence forces down to the regimental rather than battalion or squadron level. Second, no reference was made to the need for data on TLI not subject to treaty, e.g., equipment for export or held by paramilitary forces. Finally, they recommended that armed forces personnel levels be supplied for all participants rather than only Soviet and American stationed forces and units with treaty-limited items.