

CHRONOLOGY

November 1972 - SALT II begins.

1973 - US SLCM programme begins.

November 1974 - Vladivostok Accord: air-launched missiles with ranges over 600 km counted as strategic launchers.

June 1975 - Soviets propose a complete ban on all cruise missiles with ranges over 600 km.

January 1976 - Kissinger compromise: US and Soviets agree that bombers with ALCMs will count as MIRVed missiles; debate over number of surface ships allowed to carry SLCMs.

February 1976 - US proposes that the cruise missile issue be deferred.

March 1976 - Soviets propose long-range SLCMs be counted as strategic launchers.

January 1977 - US long-range ALCM B given priority over short-range ALCM A; US approves development of all variants of SLCM.

March 1977 - US Comprehensive Proposal: no limits on cruise missiles with ranges above 2,500 km.

May 1977 - US proposes a protocol which will ban GLCMs and SLCMs.

June 1977 - Carter cancels the B-1 strategic bomber.

September 1977 - Both sides agree that bombers with cruise missiles will be counted as MIRVed missiles.

April 1979 - agreement on number of ALCMs per bomber.

18 June 1979 - SALT II signed.

June 1982 - START negotiations begin. US proposes no limits on ALCMs or SLCMs until second phase of reductions. Soviets propose a ban on deployment of all long-range cruise missiles.

July 1983 - new US position: 400 bombers with 20 ALCMs each (8,000 ALCMs total).

1983 - Soviets propose bombers with ALCMs be counted as MIRVed missiles.

8 December 1983 - Soviets refuse to set date for resumption of talks.

March 1985 - Nuclear and Space Arms Talks begin.

September 1985 - Soviets propose ban on all long-range cruise missiles.

October 1985 - US proposes 350 bombers, 120 of which can carry ALCMs. Upper limit of 1,500 on ALCMs.

June 1986 - Soviets propose overall ceiling of 8,000 nuclear charges including ALCMs and SLCMs.

August 1986 - US proposes upper limit of 2,000 ALCMs.

October 1986 - Reykjavik: both sides agree to a ceiling of 6,000 nuclear warheads, including ALCMs; SLCM limits will be pursued outside the agreed warhead ceiling.

July 1987 - Soviet draft treaty proposes 400 long-range SLCMs be allowed on submarines.

December 1987 - Washington Summit: method for counting ALCMs per bomber still undecided. Both agree to continue to pursue SLCM limits. Gorbachev says the Soviets have developed a method of verification.

Early 1988 - Soviets propose further limits of 600 on conventional SLCMs and add one class of surface ship to permissible carriers.

negotiations it soon became the subject of further disagreement between the two sides. It quickly became clear that there were important differences over what had been agreed. The Soviets believed that the limit on air-launched missiles applied to cruise missiles as well as to ballistic missiles. The US position was that air-launched missiles referred only to ballistic missiles.

In December 1974, there was some discussion in the US about cancelling the short-range ALCM (AGM-86A or ALCM A) and developing the longer-range version of the SLCM for air launch. The missile escaped cancellation at least in part because it was thought to be advantageous to the US arms control position to have two visible programmes rather than one. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was in favour of using the cruise missile as a

bargaining chip and convinced Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger that the programme was worth pursuing for that purpose.

Six months later, in June 1975, the Soviet Union proposed a complete ban on cruise missiles with ranges of more than 600 kilometres. Had this proposal been made one or two years earlier, it might have prompted a positive response in the US. However, although the programme had just begun, the cruise missile had developed a number of staunch supporters in the US administration. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger had become a strong proponent of the missile and began making efforts to ensure that cruise missiles would not be traded away at the bargaining table. This sudden enthusiasm for the missile began to constrain Kissinger's ability to manoeuvre.