

together in peaceful discussions. There is still a possibility of failure, but there is a much greater possibility by now it is a probability - of a successful outcome for the negotiations, and peace. Surely the continuation of the negotiations, long as they are proving and hard as they are on the nerves of all concerned, is better than the terrible alternative.

U.N. conciliation helped to head off all-out war in Indonesia and to secure the recognition of the independent republic there, together with its admission to the United Nations.

All these peaceful methods, we repeat, come first in applying the U.N. system of collective security. And they work! At least, they have worked several times and under discouraging circumstances within the brief span of eight years.

But the Charter goes on to provide that, if peaceful methods do not suffice to settle disputes, the Security Council can act. It can impose "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations." If this doesn't work, "it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." If for some reason it does not want to take such action with the force of all the nations, it can act through the forces of regional associations approved by the U.N., such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

There would seem to be plenty of deterring factors here for any would-be aggressor to take into account. But this, experience has shown, is the part of the collective security system about which most doubts cluster. Why?

For one reason, any major action, such as a military measure, requires unanimous action in the Security Council by the five powers with a veto. That is seldom available in the present world situation. In the case of Korea it was available only because the Soviet Union was boycotting sessions of the Council at the time North Korea attacked.

Second, because the elaborate scheme for a U.N. army, which is outlined in the Charter, is one which the member-states have so far refused to carry beyond the paper stage - and there is no indication that they ever will go farther.

Third, because nations cannot be expected to risk the lives of their citizens in fighting where their own interests are not clearly involved.

And last, because any attempt by the U.N. to apply collective military measures against a major power would be another world war, no matter what persuasive name might be given it. If the military measures proposed in the Charter were ever invoked against a major power, the U.N. would be wrecked.

It is for such reasons that many individuals and some nations do not believe in the reality of the military security offered by the United Nations. In 1947 John Foster Dulles wrote an article for the Christian Century which revealed his skepticism. Mr. Dulles was not then secretary