

shouting Russians, who, struck by this wide-spreading extemporized shell, fell back discomfited. Our infantry pursued them, being led on most gallantly by one officer, the only man just then in red, the others wearing great coats.

#### INKERMAN.

The Russian arrangements were bad in all respects. The attack was undertaken against the advice of the admirals and generals, under pressure from the grand dukes, who had recently arrived in the city. General Soimonoff was to lead nineteen thousand infantry and thirty-eight guns up the Inkerman ridge to what was called Shell Hill, from which he was to assault in concert with General Pauloff, who was to lead sixteen thousand infantry and ninety-six guns across the harbor head and up to the high ground, some by a ravine north of Shell Hill, and some by the Quarry Ravine, a climb of six hundred feet; while Gortschakoff, who had replaced Liprandi outside Balaklava was to seize a corner of the upland. When the forces joined, General Dannenberg was to assume command of Soimonoff and Pauloff's armies. Neither he nor Menschikoff knew that the Careenage Ravine is absolutely precipitous at its northern end, and for some way up, and Dannenberg issued orders on the supposition that troops could cross from ridge to ridge without difficulty. Soimonoff showed his draft or orders to Menschikoff, who approved, although he had previously approved those issued by Dannenberg, and the prince left the matter of the line of advance undecided.

Mr. Kinglake has with infinite trouble disentangled by "Periods" the conflicting stories of this confused struggle, but for the purpose of this condensed account I prefer to divide the battle roughly into five attacks.

#### FIRST ATTACK.

General Soimonoff moved from the city at 2 p. m., and crossing the very difficult defile of the Careenage Ravine, got into position before daylight. He did not wait for Dannenberg, or communicate with Pauloff, but, as soon as his gunners could see, opened fire with heavy guns of position from Shell Hill against our picquets on the crest, the overshots destroying many of the 2nd Division tents pitched on the southern slope of the crest. Soimonoff halted his infantry on the neck of land, four hundred yards wide, which is bounded on the east by the upper end of the Quarry Ravine, and on the west by the glen leading down into the Careenage Ravine, while his guns played on our crest, crushing the 2nd Division battery on the east of the road, but failing to silence that on the west side. Be-

hind and about the crest were three thousand men of the 2nd Division; and half a mile further south, the Guards thirteen hundred strong. The Right Brigade Light Division, fourteen hundred men, was a mile and a half to the westward, and the 4th Division two and a half miles to the westward. Bosquet's two divisions were from two to three miles distant, guarding the southern and eastern cliff of the upland, against Gortschakoff.

Soimonoff, after a short cannonade, sent on his infantry, formed in columns, in echelon from his right. Some columns were composed of an entire battalion; others of the four companies in which the Russian infantry is organized. All got broken up by the low trees, and dissolved into crowds of men; the leading battalion, outstripping the others, was assailed by a wing of the 49th Regiment, and repulsed, carrying back its supporting battalions.

#### SECOND ATTACK.

Soimonoff then personally led on twelve battalions, numbering nine thousand men, in the same formation, but this time his attack, six battalions moving on either side of the Post Road, fell on our centre as well as our left; he had some success, driving back a battalion and taking three of our guns.

A column of Russian sailors had marched up the Careenage Ravine, the roadway of which is scarcely wide enough for "fours," and surrounding a picquet in the fog, nearly reached the 2nd Division Camp, but a detachment from the Light Division, in coming up, crossed the column from the westward just as a company of Guards snote it from the eastern side of the ravine, and it hurried back to Sevastopol.

Meanwhile, Soimonoff's attack had been vigorously met in counter attacks by detachments of the 47th, 49th, and 77th Regiments. Soimonoff was killed, our three guns were recovered, and the six battalions which had advanced against our centre were driven back. The other Russian battalions, on seeing this repulse of their comrades, followed them in the retreat.

#### THIRD ATTACK.

While Soimonoff was personally leading on his men, Pauloff's force came into action. He had sent on his leading eight battalions with one which had strayed from Soimonoff, across the Quarry Ravine. They stretched from the Post Road in the Quarry Ravine to the Sandbag battery, a frontage of five hundred yards. A wing of the 30th Regiment, two hundred strong, and the 41st Regiment, five hundred and twenty strong, in extended order, enumerating from west to east, ran at these masses and routed them, and by 8 a. m., four thou-

sand of our men had repulsed over fifteen thousand Russians.

#### FOURTH ATTACK.

General Dannenberg now arrived. Omitting all consideration of Soimonoff's men already engaged, who, being demoralized by their terrible losses, especially in officers, were sent to the rear, Dannenberg had in hand nineteen thousand fresh troops, supported by the fire of ninety guns. He brought ten thousand forward, attacking with his left, our right and centre, so as to lend a hand to Gortschakoff. Before he advanced, the Guards had reinforced the 2nd Division, and two thousand of the 4th Division, mainly detachments left in camp from the battalions which were in the trenches, were approaching under Cathcart.

The Russians fell heavily on the 41st Regiment at the Sandbag battery, and Fore ridge slopes, and the Welshmen being reinforced by the Guards, the fighting assumed the most determined character; the Russians would not accept defeat, and the struggle continued, till around the battery was formed a rampart of corpses.

Mr. Kinglake's fifth volume is a marvellous tribute to the British and Russian officers and men; but our privates are soldiers by choice, while the Russian private is conscripted against his will. No soldier can show more passive courage than the Russian, but he has not the aggressive spirit shown by Britons. The Russian officers, however, came forward again and again to lead on their columns, and one young lieutenant climbed the parapet of the Sandbag battery, and, followed by a single private, leapt down on the bayonets of our men. Nor were our officers less devoted even to death. When the 41st were being overwhelmed, Captain Richards, Lieutenants Taylor, Stirling, and Swabey, the latter of whom had been already wounded, not being able at the moment to collect men for a counter attack which they considered to be essential, charged vigorously into a Russian column and were all killed.

Till now some semblance of a line had been maintained by our men, and no success had tempted them below the Sandbag battery ledge till General Cathcart arrived. He had pushed into the fight four-fifths of his two thousand men, but with the remaining four hundred, mostly 68th Light Infantry, he descended, in contravention of Lord Raglan's wishes, the eastern slopes of the upland to attack the flank of the Russians, and the movement in advance was taken by our men on the crest. Sir George Cathcart was rapidly pushing back the foe in his immediate front, when he was fired on by Russians who had gained the ground above