

to the food resources of the United Kingdom was given in a paper recently read by Mr. Caird before the Statistical Society, London. The yield of wheat in England, he had estimated eighteen years ago at 26½ bushels per statute acre, and he believes from careful inquiries and observations it would not be safe to take credit now for a greater increase than 1½ bushels; this will bring the present rate of yield up to 28 bushels. The domestic demand for bread corn in 1863 was satisfied by an expenditure of £40,000,000, about one seventh of this sum, £6,000,000, being paid for foreign grain. Last year, according to Mr. Caird, the necessary supply cost £70,000,000 and nearly half—i.e., £33,500,000—was spent for imports. The cost of 1867, as compared with 1863, was therefore raised £30,000,000 against the consumer, but nearly the whole increased payment went out of the country, since we took in value £27,000,000 worth of foreign wheat beyond the imports of the earlier year.

Good and bad harvest years run in cycles of varying length; 1856 and 1867 were both "bad," the former two bushels and the latter six bushels under the average.

For our requirements, till the harvest of 1868 is garnered, Mr. Caird computes that we must depend upon the foreign supply of wheat to the extent of 9,600,000 quarters. A table prepared by Mr. Caird exhibits the results of some rather elaborate calculations to ascertain the average value of the principal agricultural products consumed as food in the United Kingdom.

	Home production.	Foreign supply.
Corn.....	£84,700,000	£25,000,000
Beef and Mutton	47,200,000	6,500,000
Butter & Cheese	30,100,000	8,400,000
Potatoes .....	18,000,000	200,000

Total.....£130,000,000 £40,100,000

Another table compares the value of British with Irish agricultural produce. On the aggregate value, for £1,000 worth raised in Great Britain £26 was produced in Ireland, the Irish per centage for corn being 14; for cattle, 27; for potatoes, 66; and for flax, 100 (since the growth of this fibre is restricted to the sister Isle) in the respective British values.—*Builder*.

It will be seen that *breadstuffs* are by far the largest in amount of the necessities of life imported, amounting in 1867 to the enormous value of £25,000,000 (twenty-five millions pounds sterling.) Europe, Asia and Africa have been ransacked to produce ninety-three per cent. of the amount; the United States furnishes seven per cent. Yet the latter country could undoubtedly furnish more than all the rest put together.

The surplus productions of the Western States of wheat, corn and other grains is stated to average 10,000,000 (ten million) tons annually; of this quantity about *four million* tons reach the seaboard, the rest are either used to fatten hogs, or sometimes burned as fuel, being cheaper *per cord* than hardwood. Any person acquainted with the nutritive qualities of *Indian corn*, and its various preparations must regret the obstacles which prevent its reaching the population of the United Kingdom. Under existing arrangements, although it may be bought at Chicago for 10 cents per bushel, it will cost \$1.60 cents at Liverpool.

In this transaction two parties are necessarily cheated for the benefit of a third, the

interests of the producer and consumer is sacrificed to the *freighter*, and as the latter holds a monopoly of the trade it would appear that no hope of an alleviation need be expected.

The routes of transit to the seaboard are through the United States by two railways and one small canal. It would be impossible to extend the former so as to relieve the trade in any way, and the latter is limited by the surplus waters of the Oneida Lake, which is its summit level, so that no profitable enlargement can be attempted, hedged round as the people of the United States are with the provisions of the "coasting laws" and their own protective system, the injury inflicted on their agricultural interests can only be ameliorated by getting up a wholesome competition, and one that would by its decided advantages break through the trammels of the monopolists.

Freight from Chicago to Liverpool could be delivered at 32 cents per bushel; if the Ottawa canals were constructed that could be reduced to 25 cents, so that in the one case corn could command a price at Chicago of 50 cents per bushel, and sell in Liverpool in the first case for 90, and the last for 83 cents with great profit to all parties.

The great drawback against the St. Lawrence route is the want of return cargo; on the Ottawa route this would be entirely obviated—any measure having a tendency to open either would reduce the cost of breadstuffs 40 to 50 per cent. in the English market.

Taking the population of the United Kingdom at 26,000,000 souls and the average yearly outlay for food at £220,100,000 sterling, the cost per head would be about £8 10s. sterling.

The wheat producing capabilities of Canada averages *fifteen* bushels per acre; an improved system of agriculture would enable the people to export largely, the great drawback being scarcity of skilled agricultural labor. Could not this state of affairs be remedied by a well devised system of immigration?

European complications have assumed a grave aspect, and it is probable that France and Prussia will be engaged in hostilities before the close of another year; indeed, it is impossible for two such great military powers to avoid collision for any length of time. "Coming events cast their shadows before," and a pamphlet with the title of *La Paix par la Guerre*, issued from the establishment which published the famous *brochures*, which were the precursors of the Italian war, is creating great sensation in Paris and the other European Capitals. The writer is unknown, but the following synopsis of the pamphlet shows his style of reasoning, and the programme marked out for France:

"The author insists that the only way of procuring durable peace is to go to war, and the sooner the better. Prussia, adds the

writer, is in such a position that she cannot stand still, and France cannot tolerate any further acquisitions. Prussia's dear ally, Russia, is not ready; England in case of war would remain neutral; Sweden, Denmark, and Holland would join France; and Italy would probably take the same side, as such conduct would be more to her benefit. But Germany herself would be the Emperor Napoleon's best friend, for, with all her love of unity, she hates the idea of Prussian domination. France, not to make her cause unpopular, is not to attempt any territorial aggrandisement, but to declare her sole object to be to effect the freedom of Germany as she effected the freedom of Italy. Prussia is to be driven behind the Elbe, and Hanover is to rise from its ashes and be strengthened; Russia to be forced back to proper limits, Poland to be re-established; Austria to extend her dominion to the mouths of the Danube; and the Turk to be effectually protected against Muscovite encroachment."

It is evident that throughout Continental Europe agencies are at work which will again alter the territorial divisions of its map, and probably make more than one nationality an "historical designation." The effect of a rupture of existing relations, which would enable France to attempt carrying out any part of the indicated programme would inaugurate a contest unexampled in the annals of warfare; for its gigantic proportions and the tremendous nature of the issues involved. Whether the disturbing agency in European politics is attributed to restless ambition or the exigencies of the existing military despotisms, it is a fact to be dealt with as much from its influence on our own future welfare, as the example it affords us of studying military operations on a grand scale. The late Prussia-Austrian war introduced a new era in military tactics, especially in that branch of it relating to the movement of large bodies of troops, and their rapid concentration. If ever it becomes necessary to defend Canada from invasion, the example afforded, by which ever party assumes the *defensive system* will be of great value, and should be carefully noted for future use.

Armed as the French troops are, with the most improved weapons; possessed of a powerful artillery; from temperament and tradition, full of *elan*, it is more than probable that the Empire will take the initiative. The operations of the late Prussian campaigns show the armies of that country to be possessed of an *esprit* which they never obtained credit for. Like all Saxons, they are apathetic, and do not know when they are *beaten*, but it is certain they have been outmanœuvred by the French on many occasions. Politically it is possible this coming war may involve Great Britain in its entanglements, either as a question of self defence or from a desire to preserve the *balance of power*. Acting on her avowed principles it will not be a war of conquest, although it may be one of necessity. Our duty here is to be prepared for all contingencies. Thanks to the foresight of the Hon. Minister of Militia Canada can now