

Art. XIV.—No article of this capitulation to be infringed on pretence of reprisals, and if there be any doubtful expressions in it they are to be interpreted according to the common meaning and acceptance of the words.—Granted.

Done at Yorktown, in Virginia, October 19th, 1781.

CORNWALLIS,  
THOMAS SYMONDS.

Done in the trenches before Yorktown, in Virginia, October 19th, 1781.

G. WASHINGTON,  
LE COMTE DE ROCHAMBEAU,  
LE COMTE DE BARRAS, (en  
mon-nom, & celui du Comte de Grasse.)

The last act of this political tragedy was attended with much needless humiliation; the ceremony of the surrender was unnecessarily prolonged to give the troops of Congress the pitiful satisfaction of witnessing the humiliation of soldiers they were never able to encounter successfully. On the part of the French every effort was made to soften the misfortune of a gallant foe, and the sympathy displayed by the officers of the French army was gratefully remembered by the British General and his subordinates. The force surrendered amounted to 7167, including:

1 Batt. Guards.....	57	men and officers.
1 do Light Infantry...	671	" "
17th Regiment.....	215	" "
23rd ".....	257	" "
33rd ".....	250	" "
43rd ".....	317	" "
71st ".....	300	" "
70th ".....	715	" "
80th ".....	989	" "
	3,509	" "
Artillery.....	22	" "

Total British Soldiers...	3,831	
Two battalions of Ansapch	1,017	officers and men.
Regiment of Prince Herede- tairo.....	484	" "
Regiment de Boso.....	249	" "
Yagers.....	71	" "
British Legion (Tarleton's Corps).....	111	" "
Queen's Rangers (Simcoe's)	720	" "
North Carolina Volunteers	113	" "

The remainder consisted of engineers, artificers, staff officers, and the officers of the different departments: the rank and file numbered 6039.

There was surrendered 38 pieces of field artillery, 15 howitzers, 23 mortars, 130 pieces of iron ordnance, from one to twenty-four pounders, 31 cannonades, 6 swivels, all the stores attached thereto, six stand of British regimental colors, and eighteen of German. The Charon frigate of 24 guns was set on fire and burned during the siege, as was also the Fairy of 28 guns. There were surrendered the Guadaloupe, 23; Bonetta and Valour, 24 guns each, and a privateer of 20 guns, besides 30 transports, 4 ordnance vessels, and 15 galleys, six private vessels and two Dutch prizes. The seamen surrendered numbered 840. During the siege the British had 156 men killed and 321 wounded.

On the very day this capitulation was effected Sir Henry Clinton sailed leisurely from Sandy Hook with 7000 of his best troops, and on the 24th arrived off the Capes of Virginia and remained off the mouth of the Chesapeake till the 29th, by which time he learned enough to assure even his dull understanding that another army had been sacrificed by his procrastination.

The British fleet consisted of 25 ships of the line, two 50-gun ships and eight frigates, that of the French 36 sail of the line besides frigates. In the hands of any other officer an attempt would have been made on the French fleet shut-up in the Chesapeake and unable to manœuvre, but Admiral Greaves was as great an imbecile as Sir Henry Clinton, and quite as incapable of conceiving or executing any movement outside the dull pedantic routine of his profession, as his action off Cape Henry, on the 5th of September, testifies. Neither was all the incompetence of British officers confined to New York or Yorktown; the Island of St. Eustatio was captured by the Marquis de Bouille on the morning of the 26th November, with a loss of ten men killed and wounded out of 400, which were all he was able to land, and to these 677 British soldiers surrendered by the mismanagement of their commanding officer, Lieut. Colonel Cockburn. The French acquired treasure to the value of 2,000,000 livres and 68 pieces of artillery. The dependant islands of St. Martius and Saba were also captured.

The only compensation for these misfortunes was a successful cruise of Admiral Kempenfelt. Information had been received in England that a large convoy of transports with troops, stores, and provisions was getting ready at Brest to sail in December, the greater part being destined to reinforce the fleet under the Comte de Grasse, and the remainder for M. de Suffrein's squadron in the East Indies, the whole to be conveyed a certain distance by a squadron of ships under the Comte de Guichen. A cruise for and intercept this fleet Kempenfelt was dispatched in the beginning of December, with 12 ships of the line a 50-gun ship, four frigates, and a fire ship, being all that then were in readiness for sea. On the 12th of that month he got sight of them in a gale of wind when the enemy was very much dispersed, and at once determined to take advantage of the circumstance to cut off the transports by carrying a press of sail, in which attempt he partly succeeded. Fifteen sail were captured, two or three sunk, and more than half the others lost their voyage in endeavoring to escape. At day light on the 13th the Comte de Guichen, having collected his squadron, formed in line of battle to leeward with nineteen sail of the line, and two vessels armed *en flute*. but Kempenfelt did not think it prudent to risk an engagement, being inferior in force, and bore away for Portsmouth with his prizes, leaving the Agamemnon and La Prudenta frigate to follow the French fleet with a view of picking up any of the convoy that might chance to get separated. On the 25th December they made prize of five large ships bound from Bourdeaux to Martinique, having on board 1100 soldiers and 700 seamen, laden with brass and iron ordnance, military stores and provisions. The remainder of the convoy were so scattered and dispersed that only a few with two

ships of war joined the Comte de Grasse. This action closed the campaign of 1781, which was disastrous to British arms.

THE TWO ROUTES.

There are two routes from Fort William to the Lake of the Woods which have rival claims on public attention at the present moment. We are all most anxious that the coming expedition to Red River shall proceed by the easiest, cheapest, best known, and most expeditious line of travel that can be selected. It is generally supposed that what is known as Dawson's road presents on the whole most advantages. Certainly it is most before the public mind at this moment. But what if there be another route far better, less laborious, speedier to advance by, and in every way better adapted for our present purpose of forwarding troops? We say there is such a route, perfectly available from end to end, much shorter, and one that can be travelled earlier in the season than Dawson's road. We challenge disproof of our confident assertion that Pigeon river route is incomparably the best that can possibly be adopted in our present emergency. This route is most intimately known here. Every portage, every rapid, every halting and camping place, every semi-descharge, the circumstance of every day's travel, and every particular that can facilitate the passage of troops is accurately known. We hereby most strongly urge our authorities to adopt this route for one half at least of the expedition to Red River; and we do not hesitate to say that by Pigeon river one thousand men could travel at the rate of forty-five miles a day, and from Fort Francis considerably more. From fifty to sixty miles a day is not at all an unusual journey for a canoe carrying one ton and upwards, besides ten men a bow-man and steersman. It is fairly well ascertained that neither Dawson's road, nor that by Pigeon River will form the permanent line between Fort William and the North West. But for our present purpose the latter is beyond all comparison the most favorable. Let us give our reasons.

This route is shorter by one hundred miles than Dawson's. The portages are fewer, and far easier, and their length is generally shorter. There is a continuous line of small lakes which afford most convenient channels for navigation by small vessels; even steamers could run the greater part of the distance after the removal of a few very unimportant obstructions. The advantages of these lakes running as they do in an almost unbroken line are very great; whereas by the Dawson route out of a length of 240 miles there is only about 95 miles of lake navigation; the remaining 145 consisting of rivers of various velocities. The superiority of lakes arises from the absence of currents which in rivers impede upward navigation more than they assist the downward. Lakes are not subject to any sudden changes of level which occur on most rivers.—A high flood in a lake would be of no consequence, whereas in a river it would be dangerous. Long and straight courses may be obtained in lakes, and the steering of the craft is consequently easy, but on rivers owing to their windings and eddies steering is difficult. The lakes are all deep, free from shoals and rocks, wide, and yet not so wide as to be af