argument, as conflicting with the view they favoured on the actual point before them, as to feel bound to consider and repel it. They gave their opinion that allegiance having once become due, and English naturalization as its incident, could not be alienated by subsequent occurrences. Though Scotland should be no longer under the sceptre of King James or his heirs, they thought that Scotchmen born his subjects, and capable, therefore, of becoming by residence English citizens, would remain English citizens. By similar reasoning Hanoverian subjects of William the Fourth ought, if residing in England, to be English citizens under Queen Victoria. Distinctions can be imagined. It might be contended that the case of a separation of crowns by violence, as hinted at by King James's Judges, is stronger than the Stepney case of a separation in conformity with the essential tenure of the Hanoverian throne. The Queen's Bench Division does not care to rest its disagreement with the Stuart Judges on casual discrepancies in the hypothesis. It assumes that in an instance like the present their *dicta* would have been unchanged; and it definitely differs from them. The decision in Calvin's case is binding upon it. A Court is not bound to obey *dicta*, from whatever tribunal they emanate. The Queen's Bench uses its liberty; and it dissents from the *dicta* of the beginning of the seventeenth century as courageously as as it might from any enunciated at the close of the nineteenth. To King James's Judges it appeared ridiculous that a man once an Englishman should be liable to lose his citizenship from the operation of circumstances with which he has had nothing to do. To Queen Victoria's Judges it is yet more preposterous that "a man rightfully "and legally in the allegiance of one Sov-"ereign should be also rightfully treated as "a traitor by another," as might happen, by the Jacobean view, if the subject of two allegiances formerly compatible, and now become conflicting, were caught by one of his Sovereigns fighting in the ranks of the other. The Queen's Bench Division says, "that cannot be the law." Both constructions of the law of double citizenship are doubtless susceptible of unjust and eccentric results. That adopted by the Queen's Bench Division is as open to them as the other. If, for example, a Hanoverian baker in Whitechapel had been in the full legal enjoyment of the Middlesex county franchise, at the period of King William's death, it is incongruous that a consequence of the German Salic law should have been to disfranchise him *ipso facto* unless he took out letters of naturalization. Lord Coleridge's illustration of the moral impossibility of the contrary conclusion, by reference to the peril in which innocent persons might be involved during warfare by a twofold allegiance, is itself of little assistance. Though treaties and statutes to confirm them have recently somewhat modified the original rigour of English law, the son of an Englishman continues liable to be placed by hostilities between his paternal and adopted country in a very unpleasant predicament. By Queen Anne's statute, extended by one in the reign of George the Third to grandchildren, the children of all natural-born subjects, born out of the Sovereign's allegiance, are to be deemed natural-born subjects to all purposes whatsoever. Thus, that which Lord Coleridge declares "cannot be the law" as regards the relations of Hanover and England would seem already to be the law as regards the relations of England to the whole world.

Little more can, indeed, be said for either construction than that feudal prejudices in earlier ages and high prerogative prejudices in the days of the Stuarts have led English jurisprudents into a dilemma from which it is hard for modern Courts to escape without some inconsistency. Were an English Sovereign to reign now for the first time by an independent title over dominions not included in the British Empire, the judicial view would probably be that the inhabitants of those dominions were, in default of a general Parliamentary Act of Naturalization, properly and wholly aliens. If they once be admitted by birth-right to English citizenship, it may seem strange that for no fault of their own they should forfeit the privilege. The Queen's Bench Division, which rightly considers allegiance to be due to the Sovereign in his public, and not, as King James' Judges believed, in his personal capacity, would, we suspect, have refused English citizenship to unnatu-