

through the medium of the senses, which are the connecting link between it and the outer world; while it may seem that we have not said enough about internal perception, that is, the perception of the states and acts of the mind itself. The field of the internal perceptions is really larger and more important than that of the external; and our internal perceptions are really the more numerous of the two classes. But our reasons for not introducing more here about internal perceptions are, that they do not reflect material objects behind them in the outer world, of the communication with which we are here chiefly speaking, and that they perceive the states and acts of the mind directly without the intervention of a sense medium, and are incapable of error.

Before taking up the subject of Reasoning, it may be most suitable to discuss Knowledge, and what constitutes it.

*Definition.*—Knowledge is a correct conception of things in the mind, with assurance that it is correct.

We have already seen that an act of perception creates this knowledge. An incorrect conception, even with assurance, would not be knowledge, but error; and even a correct conception, without assurance of its correctness, would not be knowledge. I can, for example, form a conception in my own mind of "John sawing wood;" but this would be but a mere picture of my own imagination, so long as I have no assurance in my mind that it is correct. I can conceive it, but I do not know it. John may indeed be sawing wood, but unless I have assurance that he is, I cannot know it as a fact.

Then, our very language, which is a reflex of the mind itself, exactly corresponds to this definition of knowledge. The copula, or predicate verb, always expresses this assurance in every proposition which expresses a fact. Thus, "John (is) at home," expresses both the conception and the assurance; but "John at home" expresses merely the conception; there is no assurance expressed with it to make it a fact. "John writes" expresses both the conception and the assurance; but "John writing" is merely a conception: assurance is not asserted in the phrase.

Locke defines knowledge as "the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas." We must confess that we think this definition exceedingly vague and unsatisfactory. Take, for example, "John is sawing firewood." According to Locke, "John" would be one idea, and "sawing firewood" would be the other idea. But if we are to cut up a conception into parts in this way, why not divide it into the number of parts which are actually in it: for "John" is one idea, and "is sawing firewood" are four, making in all five. Far better, instead of reducing the conception into parts, to leave it whole, and give assurance the distinct place in the definition to which it is entitled. Thus, "John sawing firewood" is the correct conception, and "is," the sign of assurance, gives it the true knowledge form. This is both simpler and, philosophically, more correct.

Exactly parallel to this is the practice of logical writers to divide a "judgment" in the same way. They say, "an act of judgment is an attempt to reduce to unity two ideas;" and they cut up the conception into two parts, in the same unwarrantable or rather unphilosophical way, no matter how many parts it may actually contain. "John," the one idea, has to be reduced to unity with "is sawing firewood," which they call the other idea—a misnomer surely.

Now, instead of all this, what they actually do, it seems to us, would be more correctly explained by separating the elements of a judgment or perception (for such it really is), as these fragments as one part, and the assurance of its correctness the other: "John sawing firewood" is the one; "is," the sign of assurance, is the other.

An act of judgment, then, is an act of perception or reasoning by which we obtain assurance that a certain conception is correct.

Conceptions may be subdivided into as small parts as we please, only there should never be more conceptions in a proposition than there are affirmative verbs, expressed or implied, to give to each the sign of assurance.

The principle, however, which may be regarded as justifying the division of a judgment into subject and predicate, is the fact that any part of a conception may be used to modify or describe any other part of it, and that any part of a conception may be regarded a subject of description. The part usually made the subject is the one which at the time we make the chief object of consideration.

It is time now to call attention to the fact that all our attainable knowledge is derived from two sources: (1) We can know by actual perception; and (2) we can know by reasoning. The latter we shall define after some explanations.

There are only two modes of thought possible: first, the remembrance of conceptions as they already exist in the mind; or, second, the formation of conceptions, either entirely new as to their contents, or as containing some new combination or modification of old conceptions.