

Personal opposition to President Roosevelt cannot, of course, be expected to disappear overnight, though his open opponents will become much more cautious in their criticisms and are likely to concentrate on attacking the President's conduct of the war and on blaming him for any alleged "unpreparedness" in America's defences. It has to be remembered that, the moment the United States becomes involved in war, the President's powers vouchsafed to him by the Constitution, become most formidable, and many of the restrictions which hamper his freedom of action in peace time are automatically removed. While he must not violate the Constitution or the laws, and must attempt to work in co-operation with Congress, he has otherwise practically a free hand by virtue of his position as Commander-in-chief and as director of the whole war effort. This sphere, though very wide, is not closely defined by the Constitution, and this has in the past led to difficulties, as President Roosevelt will be fully aware. Lincoln, for instance, actually attempted direct control of military operations in the field, while Congress, jealous of his authority and the use made of it, attempted through its committee "on the conduct of the war" to do the same. Wilson embarked on war with the overwhelming support of Congress, but long before peace was concluded he was seriously at loggerheads with the federal legislature. It is not suggested that history will necessarily repeat itself, but it is necessary to remember that the war-time powers of the President are potentially so immense, yet at the same time so vaguely stated, that it will require all the astuteness of President Roosevelt to prevent them from becoming a two-edged weapon even in his hands.

When Congress passed the formal resolution declaring a state of war with Japan, a wide range of measures of home security had already been put into operation in the United States. Some of these were general precautions like the prohibition of private, non-commercial aviation and of the operation of amateur radio transmitters, and the placing of censors in the main offices of the cable companies; while others were specially designed to ensure the safety of the Pacific Coast, which has always been most conscious of its vulnerability to Japanese attack from without and sabotage from within. Large sections of the coast of California were blacked out on the night of the 7th December, and Mr. A. J. Rossi, Mayor of San Francisco, declared a state of emergency in the city and asked citizens to register at once for civil defence. On the following night, San Francisco had its first air-raid warning, which the War Department described as "purely a test," although the local naval authorities said that hostile aircraft had actually approached the coast. Following an order from the President on the 8th, a number of Japanese who were regarded as "dangerous to the peace and security of the United States" were rounded up in New York and San Francisco. In 1930, there were some 70,000 persons of Japanese birth, and some 70,000 others of Japanese or part-Japanese parentage in the United States, of whom more than half were in the State of California. Mr. Joseph Shikida, Secretary of the Japanese Association of San Francisco, has appealed to his fellow-Japanese-Americans to report at once any suggestion of un-American activity. The Department of Justice itself estimates that less than 1,000 persons will be affected by the President's order.

In view of the re-avowed attitude of labour, as represented by Mr. William Green's "100 per cent. no-strike" policy and Mr. John L. Lewis's pledge to support the President "to the day of ultimate triumph over Japan and all other enemies," it is doubtful whether the Senate will now feel it necessary to proceed further with the somewhat repressive anti-strike Bill of Mr. Howard W. Smith, which an impatient House of Representatives had passed some four days before the Japanese attack.

At the moment it is not exactly clear to what extent the needs of a United States at war will affect the flow of supplies under the Lease-Lend programme to the other countries resisting Axis aggression. Just prior to the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific, that programme had become once more a topic both of formal and of informal discussion in the United States. The President's public announcement of the fact that Lease-Lend aid was being extended to Turkey received a warm welcome in the press, the Louisville *Courier Journal* of the 5th December remarking that "Von Papen's plotting and scheming have been undone for the second time by those he called 'idiotic Yankees.'" On the 3rd December the somewhat disconcerting official admission was made that Lease-Lend shipments to Russia "had so far been disappointing," although it was

anticipated that the flow of goods by the Boston-Archangel route would be "approximately abreast of schedule" by January. The Administration showed signs, at the same time, that it was becoming increasingly conscious of the urgency of reaching a full and formal agreement with this country on the Lease-Lend question—as on the wheat question; feeling that it must have some concrete, if perhaps provisional, proposals to show when asking Congress for a third Lease-Lend appropriation in January. With the country now at war, these and other political considerations will no longer have to be taken into account. Unstinted as it has been, the programme has up to now been framed to do little more than take up the slack in the American economy; henceforward it will undoubtedly be expanded to the point of demanding those sacrifices on the part of every individual citizen which the waging of total war postulates. Above all, the Administration will no longer feel obliged to poise its war effort at that hitherto precarious point of equilibrium between the requirements of peacetime industry and the much more pressing, though also more irritating, needs of defence. It is thus safe to assume that the *tempo* of American production for war will now be so accelerated, and its volume so widened, that the needs of the other opponents of the Axis will not be permanently displaced by those of the United States fighting services, but will be effectively and advantageously harmonised with them.

In his "fireside chat" on the 9th December Mr. Roosevelt told the American people: "It will not only be a long war, it will be a hard war. That is the basis on which we now lay all our plans." He also made it quite clear that he regarded it as a world war, apart from any formal declarations of belligerency. "Germany and Italy . . . consider themselves at war with the United States at this moment just as much as they consider themselves at war with Britain and Russia," he said.

The State Department has now asked the Swiss Government to take charge of United States interests in Japan. In view of the possibility that the Argentine Government, which is at present entrusted with British interests there, may itself eventually declare war, Mr. Welles has suggested that this country might care to follow suit.

#### LATIN AMERICA.

Japan's entry into the war has served to make the countries of Latin America realise a little more clearly the danger which threatens them all, and the attitude which they have taken up in the face of it may be regarded as a gratifying result of Washington's good neighbour policy. Brazil declared unequivocally that in accordance with obligations assumed towards a sister nation for the common defence of the continent she took her stand at the side of the United States, and she is proposing a conference of American foreign ministers for concerting action on questions connected with the war. The President of Uruguay having at once stated that his country could not remain neutral but would collaborate in practical measures with the United States, the Uruguayan Government soon followed this up with an announcement that it would not consider as a belligerent either the United States or other countries on her side. The Chilean Government adopted a non-belligerent attitude, took general protective measures and proceeded to sound other countries with a view to following a Pan-American policy. Mexico, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Cuba declared a policy of defensive co-operation with the United States; Mexico and Cuba declared war on Japan, Colombia broke off relations with her and all took appropriate measures against sabotage. Finally the little States of Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Hayti, El Salvador, Panamá and Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic launched against Japan a declaration of war which may not greatly affect the Japanese forces but will intimately concern Japanese Fifth Columnists in Central America. In contrast with the prompt action of all these States the interpretation which Argentina was to put on her obligations as defined at Pan-American conferences was the subject of many diplomatic discussions in Buenos Aires. After a preliminary and inglorious declaration of nothing more than neutrality, the Argentine Government later took the rather less feeble line of announcing that it would not consider the United States as a belligerent. It seems to contemplate allowing the United States extensive privileges, but the Foreign Minister has