

In mid-March, Arnold Heeney finally succeeded Pearson as Under-Secretary. Heeney had been the first Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet, and so was well versed in Ottawa politics, if less experienced in international affairs. As deputy minister, Heeney provided the administrative aptitude which the minister lacked. Pearson was "thus liberated to pursue the goals of policy he had long sought."² Heeney's appointment necessitated other changes, with Norman Robertson returning to Ottawa to assume Heeney's former duties, while Dana Wilgress took over as High Commissioner in London. The other principal diplomatic positions remained unchanged, with Hume Wrong continuing as Ambassador in Washington, Georges Vanier as Ambassador in Paris and A.G.L. McNaughton as Canada's Permanent Delegate to the United Nations. Escott Reid, who had served as Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs since Pearson's reincarnation as a politician, assumed a new position as Deputy Under-Secretary, which ensured that the flood of ideas and memoranda would not abate, though it might be diverted by Heeney.³

This continuity in the senior ranks of decision-making was matched by the perpetuation of other trends or circumstances which had been evident in previous years. There was still considerable pressure for increased representation of Canada abroad at conferences and in permanent missions. Pakistan and Ceylon had been "the only member nations of the Commonwealth in which Canada is not represented," but by year's end a High Commissioner to Pakistan had been appointed and the office opened one month later. What to do about Ceylon, however, was left unresolved until after the Colombo Conference in early 1950 (Documents 6 to 8). Latin American countries appealed for the exchange of Ambassadors, but the Canadian response, as well as a preoccupation with the legitimacy of governments there rather than with hemispheric issues, indicated Canada's relative neglect of that region (Document 10 and Chapter 14).

Undeniably, the rehabilitation of recently vanquished foes and other aspects of the aftermath of the Second World War, as well as the problems and interests of the North Atlantic community, were assigned a higher priority in Ottawa, one which was reflected in the attention of policy-makers as well as decisions about diplomatic assignments. The Department of External Affairs was able to argue that the

²Geoffrey A.H. Pearson, *Seize the Day: Lester B. Pearson and Crisis Diplomacy* (Ottawa, 1993), p. 10. John English, in *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, II: 1949–1972* (Toronto, 1992), comments that Pearson's "own administrative skills were not much admired" (p. 9). In his memoirs *The Things That Are Caesar's* (Toronto, 1972), Heeney observed that "Pearson had little time, indeed little taste, for administrative problems. His flair was for developing and negotiating avenues of solution, for action at the policy level. It has often been said and written of him that he disliked the business of running a department and that, in consequence, he was no good at it, and that he left to his officials, ultimately his deputy minister, the unpleasant decisions of personnel management and housekeeping" (p. 98). With their distinct talents and interests, as J.L. Granatstein has noted, Pearson and Heeney complemented one another well. See *A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929–1968* (Toronto, 1981), p. 241.

³Pearson, *Seize the Day*, chapter 1; *Report of the Department of External Affairs, Canada, 1949* (Ottawa, 1950), pp. 8, 11–12. On administrative developments, see also the official history by John Hilliker and Donald Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, II: Coming of Age, 1946–1968* (Montreal and Kingston, 1995), chapter 2.