

On that particular day the Prime Minister informed the House that on Monday morning he had sent messages to Mr. Eisenhower, Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and Mr. Nehru, and in those messages he expressed the hope that there would not be a negative reaction to the proposal put forward by Mr. Khrushchev.

In New York on Monday and Tuesday of last week our delegation worked very closely with the delegations from the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan in an endeavour to work out a compromise resolution which might be more acceptable to the Russians than the one they vetoed on Friday last, which had been put forward by the United States. This particular resolution was put forward by the Japanese. We were rather hopeful of this resolution that provided in its operative part for an increase in the observer group of UNOGIL and gave further authority to the Secretary-General to endeavour to stabilize the situation in Lebanon to the end that the United States could withdraw its forces.

As I said in the meeting of the Security Council on Monday of last week in support of this resolution, I deemed it a positive approach, one which offered the Council an opportunity to use and strengthen the United Nations machinery that it had in Lebanon; but this, too, the Soviet Union vetoed. And so, as far as the activities of the United Nations in Lebanon are concerned, we are back where we were at the beginning of last week. However, after the veto the Secretary-General expressed his determination to use the powers that had been voted to him on June 11 by the Security Council, and he said he would firmly proceed to implement his mandate in the resolution of the date to which I referred. I think it would be of interest to the House if I read a part of the statement the Secretary-General made on Tuesday afternoon after the veto of the Japanese resolution by the U.S.S.R. Mr. Hammarskjold said:

I am sure that I will act in accordance with the wishes of the members of the Council if I therefore use all opportunities offered to the Secretary-General within the limits set by the Charter toward developing the United Nations effort so as to help to prevent a further deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, and to assist in finding a road away from the dangerous point at which we now find ourselves.

Even before the Japanese resolution failed of adoption Mr. Hammarskjold had decided to increase the personnel of the UNOGIL in Lebanon from about 135 officers to something approximating 200, and he requested Canada to send three additional observers. The Prime Minister has