

terms of control of a bridge, since the bondholders have no ownership interest. It may be desirable that Canadian ventures be supported by Canadians on purely nationalist grounds, but in terms of financial realism, a bridge authority should be able to seek its bonded funding wherever market conditions are most favourable. The same would be true of an overall authority along the lines proposed by Ontario.

The qualifying words "when applicable" considerably weaken this guideline, since there is no clear indication what they are intended to mean, or who determines when the guideline is applicable.

As far as the actual funding of international bridges is concerned, it would seem that unless government is prepared to make a direct investment, the most practical means of funding is the issuing of bonds, since this ensures that control remains vested in the authority, and perhaps this guideline should be reworded to make this form of funding obligatory in the case of public authorities.

In the past, bond issues have been tied to the reversionary process, and consequently the issuing of additional bonds at a later date has resulted in the postponement of reversion. This situation would not arise in future, since the creation of public authorities eliminates any need for reversion.

- d) The borrowing powers granted to a bridge authority must be subject to the approval of the Governor in Council.

This guideline was obviously intended to provide a federal instrument of control over future international bridge operations, but it is possible that there could be a conflict between guidelines b) and d). A joint international authority could not be totally responsible to both national governments, nor could either government have the ability to approve borrowing powers in the other country. In the