The capacity of sanctions to persuade the people of a target state to compel their government to comply with international standards proved to be quite empty when in 1937 the League imposed sanctions on Italy in the hope of stopping the invasion of Ethiopia. The force of patriotism, and the capacity of the fascist government to intimidate the Italian people, was too great. The sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union by the Carter administration in 1979 following the invasion of Afghanistan were no more effective. A Soviet trade official, V. Malkevich, wrote at the time that "no one has yet succeeded in influencing the home or foreign policy of the USSR by means of economic blackmail, discrimination, or diktat. If it ever had any effect, moreover, it has been simply the opposite of the one counted on: tension between countries always forces each of them to harden its position."29 In societies which are freer than was fascist Italy or the Soviet Union, the general public may constitute an important linkage connecting economic sanctions to policy formulation, but it is surprising that President Bush had any hope that the people of Iraq could compel Saddam Hussein's government to change its policies. From public knowledge of President Saddam Hussein's character and of that of the Baath party, there was no reason to believe that they were likely to be receptive to public complaints. Judge Webster made clear his belief that economic sanctions would not lead to revolt:

Services ranging from medical care to sanitation have been curtailed in Iraq. But these hardships are easier for Iraqis to endure than the combination of economic distress, high casualty rates and repeated missile and air attacks that Iraqis lived with during the eight year Iran-Iraq War. During this war incidentally, there was not a single significant public disturbance, even though casualties hit 2.3 percent of the Iraqi population.<sup>30</sup>

Even a month of intense bombing did not lead to spontaneous revolt. On 15 February 1991, President Bush, frustrated by the refusal of the Iraq government to comply with the United Nations demands, called upon "the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands, to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside and to comply with the UN resolutions and then rejoin the family of peace-loving nations." This invitation was eventually taken up by the Kurdish and Shiite minorities,

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> V. Malkevich, <u>East-West Economic Cooperation and Technological Exchange</u>, (Moscow: Academy of Sciences, 1981), p. 14 (as quoted by Peggy L. Falkenheim, *loc cit*.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Report for the 101st Congress, Friday December 7, 1990 5:40 EST.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> United States, Department of State, <u>Dispatch</u>, 2/3 (21 January 1991), p. 37. Speech to the American Association for the Advancement of Science.