

will to fight in the event of war, the need for caution was particularly stressed. At the NATO Council meeting in New York in September, 1950 it was decided not to admit Turkey but it was agreed that "association of the Turkish Government with the appropriate phase of the planning work of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with regard to the defense of the Mediterranean would contribute significantly to the defense of that area". The Council invited the Turkish Government to be associated with NATO for that purpose and Turkey agreed. Greece was given and accepted a similar invitation.

115. Unfortunately this solution did not meet the wishes of either country, where concern for the future had been sharpened by the serious developments in Korea at the end of the year. As a result defense planning made little, if any progress in that area. When a meeting of the heads of the U.S. missions in the Middle East was held in Ankara in February, 1951, they drafted a recommendation to the State Department that "other things being equal", a mathematical phrase with more apparent than real clarity, "the best method to provide for the security of these countries was to invite their adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty". It was not until a story about this recommendation had appeared in the New York Times and enquiries were made that the State Department admitted to the Canadian Embassy on March 20, 1951 that the recommendation was being studied. It promised that the United States would consult other treaty members as soon as it had decided to support such a recommendation. Shortly afterwards, the fact that Mr. Pearson invited the Greek and Turkish Ambassadors to attend the luncheon given on the second anniversary of NATO (April 4) seemed to have rekindled the hopes of the representatives of the two countries that Canada was also willing to reconsider sympathetically their position. The Departmental view, as given to the Canadian Ambassador in Washington on April 20, 1951 was that so far as Canada was concerned "the cons were more convincing than the pros". Ad hoc arrangements for the defence of the Middle East could be based more effectively on existing foundations than by a new arrangement such as the extension of NATO. It was still true that Canada would not oppose the admission of Turkey and Greece, if the other powers and particularly the United States wished to accept them. But what was preferable was serious consideration of other courses of action several of which were mentioned, "since we consider that the admission of Turkey to NATO is not to the best of our interests in present circumstances". These views were communicated to the State Department on an informal basis. It promised to bring them at once to the attention of the interdepartmental group working on the problem and to inform the Department what decisions were made before the question was brought up in NATO. However on May 15, the U.S. Ambassador called on the U.K. Foreign Office to present an aide-memoire, which said that the United States had come to the conclusion that the relationship of Greece and Turkey to NATO could best be met by their inclusion as full members. The same action was taken in France, as both these countries were linked with Turkey in security pacts. On the following day this news leaked to the press in both London and New York. In the Foreign Office the official feeling was that they would have preferred an alternative solution to that suggested, but, "if the United States held firmly to the view that only the inclusion of the two countries in NATO can solve the problem, the Foreign Office isn't likely to oppose this development". The question was formally raised by the United States in the NATO Deputies' meeting on May 16 with a request for an early discussion.

116. In Ottawa there was indignation at the failure of the United States to inform Canada in advance, of its position, and annoyance at the speed which the press had learned of developments. Canada House was told, apropos of the U.S. suggestion for an early