

4. Partly related to the financing problem, but also partly due to its limited personnel, research and industrial base, the Agency depends on states for various extrabudgetary contributions and support for safeguards. While this both is inevitable and may have advantages, it may also produce certain frictions in the sense that some activities are likely to be deemed to be candidates for such support, while others are not.
5. More generally, the Agency's experience shows the necessity for a variety of support services, at adequate levels, for the performance of its safeguards functions. In some cases their adequate supply by the verification agency itself would seem more desirable than dependence on states.

#### Miscellaneous

1. The Agency safeguards are in some cases backed up by a network of bilateral safeguards agreements, which would come into play if the Agency were unable to carry out its safeguards function. While these bilateral requirements can complicate the Agency's efforts, they can also serve as a limited safety net. The problems and possibilities of co-ordination between agency safeguards and national export controls in a chemical weapons convention should be considered. However, the limitations of these bilateral arrangements if a state were determined to withdraw from or violate obligations should be recognized.
2. The Agency has very limited sanctioning powers. Of these, its greatest may be simply its right to report and to publicize instances of its inability to verify compliance. This may be a realistic sanction for a verification agency.
3. An international verification agency offers side benefits through providing a forum for continued consultation and co-ordination, and a mechanism through which ambiguous cases might be dealt with before they become major political problems.