military balance and (2) became seriously concerned about the possibilities of misperception and escalation causing unwanted war during a crisis. The extent to which domestic politics in its various forms and the "normal" processes of defence and foreign policy formulation and execution in each country would constrain the opportunities for negotiating and implementing Confidence-Building Measures remains a largely unexplored area. These internal factors *could* sharply limit the possibility of implementing major Confidence-Building Measures.

A fourth image of at least equal analytic interest can be constructed from plausible evaluations of Soviet capabilities, intentions and concerns. It is similar to the third image in most respects but it depicts a Soviet Union (and Warsaw Treaty Organization) that possesses significantly greater conventional military power than does NATO. As in image three, however, the Soviet Union has no real intention of attacking NATO. In this image.

1. The Soviet Union and its WTO allies possess significant advantages in a number of conventional military categories, realize this fact and are seen to enjoy these significant advantages by NATO. The advantages, although "significant," do not (and are not seen to) confer an obvious "war winning" capability on the WTO;

2. Decision makers in the Soviet Union have an unnecessarily elevated fear of the West but do not believe (a) that an attack from the West is imminent nor (b) that an attack against the West in Europe would enjoy a reasonable chance of success. Soviet leaders, however, do expect a measure of diplomatic "respect" commensurate with their recognized military strength;

3. The Soviet national security policy process is primarily driven by incrementalism and a distinctly "Russian" "strategic culture" which makes it (like virtually all national security policy processes) respond largely to internal rather than international forces and concerns. Because the Soviet Union has created its impressive conventional military capabilities primarily through unilateral efforts and at great sacrifice, it is unlikely to consider major arms control initiatives (including Eurocentric Confidence-Building Measures) unless they yield advantages to the Soviet Union that would otherwise be

more difficult to obtain. Western concerns about "stability," particularly conceptions of cooperative mutual stability are not shared by Soviet political and military decision makers. In Soviet eyes, "defence" is primarily the product and responsibility of unilateral effort.

The four images constructed above represent a rough cross-section of plausible alternative interpretations of the Soviet "reality". Each image captures the essence of a distinct and very different conception of Soviet conventional military capabilities and intentions along with the associated Soviet beliefs and fears. Each of these "images" depends upon a particular interpretation of three basic image components: (1) the perception (and the objective reality) of the conventional military balance; (2) the perception (and the objective reality) of adversary military and foreign policy intentions and plans; and (3) the susceptibility to influence and capacity for change of military posture, doctrine and overall national security policy. Obviously, more variables could be used, revised and/or additional image components could be constructed and a greater variety of interpretations for each variable could be included to create a vastly more complex set of images.[75] The frightening thing about this range of images – from both an analytic and a policy-oriented perspective – is the fact that most of them are plausible and some are extremely convincing summaries of what we (as Hawks and Doves) "know" or think we know about the Soviet Union and its military policies. This profusion of competitive images, many of which seem entirely plausible, is daunting. More dis-

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75   Casual inspection suggests that *over 1290 distinct images* could be constructed simply using the three existing rather gross image components. (Note that the first two components have several distinct subcomponents which expand substantially the number of overall permutations and combinations.) More subtle and varied additions would catapult the number of distinct images into the tens of thousands. It is true, of course, that some combinations might be composed of logically incompatible elements (although none are obvious) and that not all of these separate images would have unique implications for Confidence-Building Measures in Europe. It does seem highly likely, however, that a considerable variety of opportunities for CBMs – from very favourable to impossible – must be associated with so many different possible Soviet (and WTO-NATO) "realities".

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