

claims, bearing in mind the resolutions and principal objectives of the United Nations relating to Palestine, including religious interests of third parties. It also asked the Conciliation Commission to be available to aid the negotiations if so desired, adding—to meet Asian arguments—that it should continue the work entrusted to it under Assembly resolutions.

In supporting this draft resolution the Canadian Representative recalled the Conciliation Commission's view that harmony could be restored only by a compromise in which Israel would do its best to counteract the dislocations caused by its own establishment among the Arabs and the latter would try to adapt themselves to the new state of affairs. Canada realized that the genuine peace negotiations the sponsors advocated might prove extremely difficult for both parties, but suggested that a request from the Assembly might facilitate matters.

The Arabs insisted that it was not enough for negotiators to "recall" and to "bear in mind" United Nations resolutions; these must be "reaffirmed" and used as "a basis for" a settlement. Israel, on the contrary, insisted on "unconditional" negotiations. Four Asian states submitted an unsuccessful draft resolution which said nothing about negotiations but reaffirmed the Assembly's resolution of January 26, 1952.¹ A Syrian proposal that advisory opinions relating to refugees be sought from the International Court of Justice was also defeated. On December 11 the 8-power draft resolution was approved in committee by more than a two-thirds majority, but failed of adoption in plenary meeting on December 18 when support was reduced to a simple majority (24 in favour, including Canada, 21 against and 5 abstentions). The defeat of the proposal for direct negotiations was brought about by a last-minute dual amendment offered by the Philippines in aid of the Arabs, asking that the negotiations should be "on the basis of" United Nations resolutions and referring specifically to the internationalization of Jerusalem. Canada voted against the first part of the amendment and abstained on the second, on the ground that effective international supervision of the Holy Places, which Canada supports, has not been possible on the basis of territorial internationalization. Neither part of the dual amendment received two-thirds majority support. Several Latin American states which had formerly supported the 8-power resolution abstained in the final vote because the reference to Jerusalem had not been adopted.

The Arabs were gratified that the Assembly failed to recommend direct negotiations on the basis suggested. The Representative of Israel interpreted the vote to mean that the Arab states and Israel were now left confronting each other under the terms of the Charter, with no Assembly resolution to serve as a directive. The Conciliation Commission, however, decided on January 28, 1953, that it was bound to continue its work under the Assembly resolution of January 26, 1952 and continued to work for the release of frozen refugee assets in Israeli banks.

¹See *Canada and the United Nations 1951-52*, pp. 31-34.