

the troops, and as scouts they would have been invaluable. That they would still do so if requested by the authorities is probable; but delay, for which reasons were not wanting, if prolonged may change their mood. The refusal to employ Indians against the Half-breeds was creditable to the motives of humanity by which it was prompted. In his first insurrection Reil refused to accept the aid of Indians; at present he does everything he can to induce them to join the standard of revolt. The attack on Fort Pitt and the massacre at Frog Lake may be regarded as responses to his invitations and menaces. Even at Duck Lake Indians stood side by side with Half-breeds. Under the circumstances, the employment of Indian auxiliaries as scouts would be justifiable. No one knows so well as an Indian what Indians will be likely to do under any given circumstances, and Indian scouts would be likely to obtain exact details of what the enemy was doing; the value of the inferences which they would draw from what could be seen would be heightened by their ability to explain the mysteries of Indian tactics. The Half-breeds adopt the Indian mode of fighting, but they graft upon it something that they have learned from the white man. A guerilla warfare, carried on in ambush, is distinctly Indian, but the addition of artificial rifle pits is the utilization of a lesson which the Half-breeds have learned from the whites. Against the mongrel race Indian scouts would not be less valuable than against Indians. In the infancy of colonization in America, both French and English regularly employed Indians in war. The precedent is not necessarily an example for us: it was justified, if at all, by the conditions on which the war had to be carried on. Without the aid of friendly Indians, the French colonists in Canada would certainly have been annihilated; with the Iroquois, joined to other tribes with whom the English were frequently at war, the progress of colonization in New England would have been slow and precarious. Indian allies were indispensable to both nations, if employed by either. The Half-breeds, if extensively successful in securing Indian allies, might make it an object for the Government to accept, for limited employment, Indian auxiliaries; but in that event it would be necessary to make such a disposition of them as would keep them under control.

THERE are people who try to make the Mounted Police, by their action at Duck Lake, responsible for all the blood that has been or may be shed in the North-West insurrection, with its adjunct of an Indian war. According to them, the police should have waited the pleasure of the armed band which had gone to dispute their passage; in other words have put themselves completely in the power of men, dalliance with whom might have accomplished their own destruction. And, as a matter of fact, though little importance can be attached to it, the Half-breeds were the first to fire. These critics add that no further fighting ought to have followed the affair of Duck Lake. Their plan was and is to send to Riel and Dumont ambassadors in whom the insurgents have confidence, and let a parley take place between men of mutual sympathies, with a view of coming to an understanding. If the authority of the Government had not been defied and blood shed, such a procedure would have been in every way desirable; but you cannot argue with an insurrection which is entrenched behind natural and artificial fortifications, which has massacred peaceable and defenceless settlers and priests, and carried away white men and women to be subjected to the nameless horrors of Indian captivity. Deeply as the necessity must be regretted, the only course open to the authorities, after the outbreak had commenced, was that which has been taken. The advice to act otherwise does not originate in actual sympathy with the insurrection; the sympathy is that which arises out of the ties of blood and religion, and it is wasted, not without good intent probably, on the men in insurrection, and takes no account of the greater number against which the insurrection is aimed.

IN the course of an affray in the House of Commons, caused by an article of the *Toronto News* attacking the French, the domestic affairs of the *News* have been dragged to light. We do not go in quest of intelligence of this sort, nor do we even notice it when it obtrudes itself, unless it happens to carry with it some lesson of importance to the public. In the present instance it does carry with it a lesson of the very highest importance to the public. It reveals in the strongest light a danger which attends the most powerful of modern institutions. It forces us to ask the momentous question: What is behind the Press? The *Mail* is a Conservative journal. The *News* is ultra-democratic and semi-communistic. Behind both is revealed the same capitalist vending two opposite sets of opinions. It is useless to pretend that Mr. Riordon is not the owner of the *News*. He evidently owns it under cover of a mortgage, and there can be no doubt that he is perfectly its master and thoroughly responsible for the line which it takes. Besides, though the *Mail* vehemently disclaims any present connection with the *News*, there was undeniably a connection between them

when they were published under the same roof; and at that time they took different lines on public questions. The pretence that Mr. Riordon is merely the paper-maker is at variance with the most notorious facts. But there is something worse than this. To make the *News* sell and to recover the money which he had sunk in it, the late Mr. Riordon put it into the hands of an editor trained on the social press of the United States, and who he must have known would proceed to extend the circulation by offering to the public taste the stimulants of personality and libel. Probably there was an actual understanding that this was to be done; at all events the policy was approved by Mr. Riordon who reaped its fruits. An immensely wealthy man was willing to swell his money bags in secret by setting unprincipled writers to traduce the characters and wound the feelings of his fellow-citizens. He at the same time introduced into this community the journalism of scandal and libel, a moral pestilence not less noxious than any physical contagion. The plague has not failed to spread; and Toronto has been filled with a foul literature of social slander, the purveyor of which, if he could be unmasked, might perhaps be found to be himself filthier in character and habits than the foul literature that he purveys.

IT may now be safely said that at present there will be no war between England and Russia. The opinion to which we leaned from the first has proved correct, though we must own that at one time the chances were greatly the other way. All right-minded men, knowing what war always is, and what this war in particular would have been, will approve the conduct of the Minister in preserving peace if it could be done on terms honourable to England. Nor does it appear that the terms are otherwise than honourable to England. Evidently they do not satisfy the war party at St. Petersburg. A mere general suspicion of the designs of Russia or a surmise that she will not keep faith is an insufficient reason for precipitating a terrible war. Blood cannot be shed in anticipation of possible wrongs. If Russia hereafter breaks her covenant she must again be called to account. On the other hand, diplomacy would not have been able by any legal or ethical demonstrations to bring the war party at St. Petersburg to its senses or loosen its hold upon the weakness of the Czar without a force of a more substantial sort behind it. To the spirit shown by Great Britain and the vigour with which she prepared for war must be mainly ascribed the preservation of peace. The Millennium is still a long way off; the world is still a rough one; and the lovers of peace, among whom all good men and good Christians are numbered, must still be content to have armaments, as they have bars and bolts to their windows and doors, to keep up the military qualities, and to pay due honour to the soldier's calling. Had the counsels of the extreme peace party in England prevailed during the last twenty years we should have had first a Muscovite march to Delhi, and then a most disastrous and very protracted war.

IN forecasting the character of a war between the land power of Russia and the naval power of England the old similitude of a battle between a dog and a fish has been magnified into a battle between an elephant and a whale. It happens, however, curiously enough, that the whale has probably more to fear on the sea than on the land. A descent upon the coasts of England is out of the question: she can be attacked by a Russian army only on her Indian frontier, where her closeness to her base will practically multiply her forces, while Afghanistan, if its mountaineers are true to her, will form a rampart scarcely penetrable by the Muscovite hosts. In number the Russian Army is overwhelmingly superior to the British, but the disproportion is not greater than was the disproportion at Inkerman. That the Russian soldier has solid qualities, that in the mass he will stand indomitably to be shot, was proved at Eylau and Borodino: at Eylau, had Benningsen only remained on the ground which his troops had doggedly held, instead of ordering a needless retreat, the ambition of Napoleon might have found an earlier doom. But long-range rifles and artillery, marksmanship and skirmishing, have greatly reduced the value of automatons in serried columns; and the Russian is signally wanting both in intelligence and in dash. On the Tchernaya he was beaten by the Italians: the Italians have always been beaten with ease by the Austrians; and the Austrians have been beaten by everybody else. Had the Turk been better equipped and supplied, it is more than likely that he would have proved a match for his invader. The Sikhs and the Ghoorkas, as well as the English, may safely be set down as superior to the Russians; whether the other native Indian troops would stand against Europeans is more doubtful: they certainly would not without a large proportion of Europeans on their side. On the whole, the prospect for England would be fair: at least she could hardly receive any mortal wound. But her vastly extended commerce would offer vulnerable points without number to