

brigade may get mixed up with the whole of a leading brigade, in addition to the temporary mingling of two regiments of the same brigade, and naturally the edges of divisions and brigades fighting alongside each other will sometimes overlap. That is unavoidable; but if the troops be otherwise well in hand it will soon and easily be remedied. Still, under any circumstances, there must be confusion and mixing up of men belonging to different companies, battalions, &c. We admit so much frankly, but we contend that by a judicious system the evil may be reduced to a minimum and kept to a certain extent under control. On the other hand we maintain that the long thin order of battle, with command extending over length rather than breadth, tends to add to this evil as well as to produce other bad consequences.

It is astonishing how much words influence things, and an illustration is afforded by the existing system of tactics. We apply the term "reinforce" to two different processes. One is that of strengthening a firing line by bringing up another line, melting the two lines and fusing them. The other is that of interpolating in the firing line fragments of another line in rear, the interpolated fragments retaining their homogeneity. To our thinking the former method is only advisable in the case of portions of the same company, and only to be tolerated in the case of two companies of the same battalion. The term reinforce being used indifferently for both processes, it has seemed, probably, to many unimportant as to which should be adopted. We would suggest that the phrase "thicken the line" should be employed in case of a fusion, and the word "reinforce" be reserved for thrusting homogeneous fragments into the firing line.

As we have said above, we hold it to be of the highest importance that each officer should retain the control of those under his command as long as possible, and that he should not sink into a mere cypher or an example of personal courage until the last section should have been absorbed into the actual firing line. We by no means wish to see a major general interfering with a colonel, or a colonel with a captain. Till lately there was too much of that, and it is desirable that an officer, on being given a certain task, should be allowed to work out all details himself. Still, if the battalion once formed into order of attack is to feel no longer the hand of its chief, the latter may just as well, for all the good he would do, fall to the rear for luncheon as remain to be shot at like a soulless target. The colonel has a wider view than the captain, and may see that circumstances have changed since the company was sent against the enemy, or that Captain A, must, in order to combine his operations with those of Captain B, make some modification of his arrangements, change his direction slightly, &c., &c. Similarly, the general has a wider view than the colonel, and may feel convinced that a local success must give way to general considerations. Consequently, it cannot be right that the company and battalion should respectively escape completely from the general control of the colonel and the brigadier. But with the present system of tactics both company and battalion do so escape.

This is a state of things to be remedied, and the remedy which we would suggest is but a modification of present detailed arrangements, though a revolution in existing general practice. We would propose that—

1st.—A distinction between thickening and reinforcing the firing line should be recognized.

2nd.—That no thickening should ever take place save by portions of the same company.

3rd.—That when the company's support and reserve shall have been ordered up, reinforcements should take place, *i.e.*, that fresh tactical sub-units should be interpolated.

4th.—That as far as possible the companies of the same battalion should be kept together in the firing line.

5th.—That for every 1,000 yards of position or front of attack the proportion of troops should be increased.

6th.—That if necessary to lengthen the general line in excess of this proportion, the additional space should be obtained by increasing intervals between brigades or divisions; and that in all cases there should be a sufficiently large interval, clearly separating each brigade from the brigades on its flanks.

7th.—That command should extend over depth rather than breadth, in all cases, from the company upwards.

8th.—That each body from the company upwards should have its local support and reserve at the commencement of an action.

With regard to the latter point, we cannot too strongly advocate Colonel Macdonald's system of dividing a company into groups of fours, and providing four successive lines. On the last of these coming up the company is put together in two ranks, just as it was before the advance, with the exception of casualties during that advance. In the matter of gaining ground to the front under fire, we consider that there should be no rigid rule. Indeed, no rigid rule on that subject either

has been or will be observed. In some cases the sudden rush of a section, half company or company, under cover of the smoke of a volley, will be best. In other cases, especially when at a distance, it will be as well for the whole or a large portion of the line to advance at a brisk walk, halting from time to time when cover offers to fire a few volleys. Again, when there is little cover and the distance from the defenders short, it will be expedient to gain ground gradually from the right or left of companies or half companies by the right or left hand man either crawling or suddenly rushing forward in a stooping attitude, say 15 or 20 paces, the next man imitating his example and placing himself on his flank, and so on successively till the whole company or half company shall have taken up a fresh line in advance.

To be continued.

THE WINNIPEG INFANTRY SCHOOL.

(From the *Manitoban* Oct. 13th.)

The quarters for the officers and men of the new School of Mounted Infantry at Fort Osborne are rapidly approaching completion, and very soon regular barrack life will commence and everything get shaken down into running order. Ten huts in all have been utilized, five on each side of the main street, if it can be so called. They have been newly shingled, stoops put to the doors, re-plastered and cleaned inside, shelving erected, and new partitions put up. The huts are numbered from one to ten, No. 1 being occupied by Colonel Taylor, the commandant of the school. No. 2 is being fitted up as a recreation room, where the men propose to amuse themselves in their leisure moments, give concerts and entertainments, etc. Nos. 3 and 4 are barrack rooms where the men sleep, and are each fitted up with a small room for the sergeant in charge. No. 5 hut, situated at the south-western extremity of the right hand row, is the quarter-master sergeant's store, and will be fitted up with tailor's and butcher's shops, etc. Crossing to the end hut, No. 6, on the left hand row, the band room is found. This is furnished with quarters for the bandmaster or the bugle-major, both offices being united at present, and also quarters for the drill instructor situated at the rear end. The huts on this side are occupied, and in the band room rows of beds neatly covered with rather ornamented blankets line each side of the room. The shelf over each bed is also occupied with each man's kit. Huts No. 7 and 8 are also barrack rooms, whilst No. 9 is the sergeant's mess-room, and contains the sergeant major's and quartermaster-sergeant's quarters. The main body of the hut is divided by folding doors and one-half used as a mess-room and the other as a reading room, whilst the canteen and kitchen occupy the rear. No. 10 is the officers mess-room and is laid out suitably. Up to the present the corps numbers 34 non-commissioned officers and men, but others are on their way from the eastern provinces to join, and three or four of the 7th Fusiliers (London), are expected to arrive to-day. The names of those who have joined up to the present are as follows:

NON-COM. OFFICERS.—Sergt.-Major Bilman, Q.M.-Sergt. Taylor, Bugle-Major Anderson, Sergt. Gardiner, Sergt. Potts, Hospital-Sergt. Pennefather.

PRIVATES.—Pte. Skinner, late of Winnipeg Cavalry; Pte. Elwood, late of 92nd; Pte. Martin, late of 92nd; Engler Weale, late of 92nd; Pte. Dennis, late of 92nd; Pte. Pulsford, late of 92nd; Pte. Watson, late of 51st Regiment of the Line; Pte. Hardisty, late of 91st; Pte. Sherman, late of 91st; Pte. Munsell, late of 91st; Pte. Wilson, late of 91st; Pte. Garbett; Pte. Calder; Pte. Ellis, late of 90th; Pte. Dunn, late of 90th; Pte. Bates, late of 90th; Pte. J. R. Skinner, late of 92nd; Pte. C. P. Braithwaite, 46th Regiment of the Line; Pte. Carnegie, late of 7th Fusiliers; Pte. Crawford, late of 7th Fusiliers; Pte. Greig, late of 7th Fusiliers; Pte. Shephard, late of 92nd; Bugler Wertheim, late of 90th; Pte. Egerton, late of 1st Dragoon Guards; Pte. Kilpatrick, late of 92nd; Pte. Simpson, late of the North-west Mounted Police; Pte. Barncastle, late of 92nd; Pte. Kinniburgh, late of 92nd.

The men are all up to a high standard, and, without an exception, are smart, intelligent, active young men, and just the material of which the best soldiers are made. Most of them are of medium height or a little over, and as a body would delight the eye of a veteran general. In selecting the men the officers of the school have been most particular a good character being as essential as a sound constitution, and they are to be congratulated on having got together a body of men who cannot fail to be a credit to the new school and an acquisition to the city of Winnipeg. The men have, almost without an exception, received some preliminary training in carrying arms being drawn for the most part from the volunteer corps which took an active part in the late rebellion. The bandmaster and bugle-major is a gentleman of large experience in musical matters, and he hopes in the near future to work up a first-class band.