*advisari vult*. And the remarkable feature of all was that he himself was the only person who doubted. Lyndhurst, who succeeded him, stated the case epigrammatically in a speech in Parliament in 1829, when, alluding to Eldon, he used these words: "It has been often said in the profession that no one ever doubted his decrees except the noble and learned lord himself." And the words were no unmeaning compliment, since it is said by Campbell that only two of his decisions were ever reversed by the House of Lords.

He himself was not insensible to his weakness, and in his "Anecdote Book," a sort of fragmentary autobiography in manuscript, which he wrote in his later years for the entertainment of his grandson, he thus excuses his faults of hesitation—and very satisfactorily, it must be confessed: "I always thought it better to allow myself to doubt before I had decided, than to expose myself to the misery, after I had decided, of doubting whether I had decided rightly and justly." And he seems to have guided himself by the advice of the celebrated French chancellor, D'Aguesseau, to his son: "My son," said the chancellor, "when you shall have read what I have read, seen what I have seen, and heard what I have heard, you will feel that if on any subject you know much, there may be also much that you do not know; and that something even of what you know may not, at the moment, be in your recollection; you will then, too, be sensible of the mischievous and often ruinous consequences of even a small error in a decision; and conscience, I trust, will then make you as doubtful, as timid, and consequently as dilatory, as I am accused of being."

He was, moreover, proverbially slow in the hearing of causes, encouraging rather than restricting argument, and willingly hearing all the counsel on either side, juniors as well as seniors, without restriction or hindrance. Upon this point, he says, in the case of *Ex parte* Pease, 1 Rose, 237: "I know a great deal of time is consumed in hearing arguments, but a great deal of justice is the result."

Three objects he seems to keep prominently in view in all his judicial decisions. These he states in his opinion in Attorney General v. Skinner's Company, 2 Russ. 437, as follows: "Looking back to my judicial conduct—I hope with no undue partiality or self-indulgence—I can never be deprived of the comfort I receive when I recollect that in great and important cases I have endeavored to sift all the principles and rules of law to the bottom, for the purpose of laying down in each new and important case as it arises something, in the first place, which may satisfy the parties that I have taken pains to do my duty; something, in the second place, which may inform those who, as counsel, are to take care of the interests of their clients, what the reasons are upon which I have proceeded, and may enable them to examine whether justice has been done; and, further, something which may contribute towards laying down a rule, so as to save those who may succeed to me in this great situation much of that labor which I have had to undergo by reason of cases having been not so determined, and by reason of a due exposition of the grounds of judgment not having been so stated."

Again, he says in his "Anecdote Book:" "I thought it my indispensable duty as a judge in equity to look into the whole record, and all the exhibits and proofs in cases, and not to consider myself as sufficiently informed by counsel. This I am sure was right." And he once narrated, with much satisfaction, that Lord Abergavenny had told him that he had compromised a suit because his attorney had told him there was a weak point in his case, which, though the opposing parties had not discovered it, "that old fellow" would be sure to find out if the case came before him.

His judicial style has been severely criticised, and his opinions are by no means models of rhetoric. His sentences are generally long, frequently involved, and his choice of terms is not always elegant when tested by literary standards. But it is to be remembered that his opinions, like those of most English judges, were always delivered extemporaneously, and that he rarely made use of the aid of notes. Unless in one or two cases which he decided by consent of the parties after he resigned the great seal, he never put pen to paper in preparing his opinions. It is to be remembered, too, that from the time when he began to fit himself for the bar he utterly relinquished literature, and while he did not, like Blackstone, bid farewell to his muse in atrocious verse, the