

necessity. His letter shows that he knew more than we now do, of the aspirations of our American cousins for a continuous coast line from Mexico to the Arctic ocean. He had the vision; and he realized the necessity of taking a step which exasperated his enemies and almost staggered his friends. He knew the exact feelings of British Columbia, and realized that financial desperation may lead to regrettable results. Possibly he knew more than other people of the inner history of the Banks Bill and of the Annexation Petition. Surely nothing but undiluted spleen could cause Sir Richard Cartwright in 1912 to write: "He was also guilty of contracting a very improvident and dishonest bargain with British Columbia."

With the promise, then, of a railway connection, British Columbia became on 20th July, 1871, a part of the Dominion of Canada.

But now that the railway was promised, how was it to be constructed? In 1871, on the motion of Sir George Etienne Cartier, it was decided that it should be built by a state-aided company. Two companies came forward clamoring for the contract; one was headed by Sir Hugh Allan, the founder of the Allan line; the other was formed by Sir D. L. Macpherson and his associates. An attempted fusion having failed, a new company, including members of both the old companies, was formed under the presidency of Sir Hugh Allan. Sir John Macdonald in the elections of 1872, claimed, not like Augustus, that he had found Rome brick and left it marble, but that he had found Canada a mere parish and made it continent-wide. He was returned, but with a diminished majority. During the session of 1873, Mr. Huntingdon, the member for the County of Shefford, made charges against him in connection with campaign funds received from Sir Hugh Allan. Out of this grew the Pacific Scandal, so-called,—with its celebrated telegram from Sir John: "I must have another ten thousand,"—which led in the fall of 1873 to the resignation of the Conservative Government.

Alexander Mackenzie, the new Premier, was a man of sterling worth and character; but he was a hard-headed Highland Scotsman to whom money was real, and mountains, stern and forbidding. The construction of a continuous railway, 2,500 miles in length, commencing at a point on the eastern side where no person lived and terminating at a point on the western side where very few people lived, passing through a territory almost uninhabited and but

imperfectly known, with its barrier ranges of gigantic mountains, was to his practical mind a stupendous—an overwhelming—undertaking. The promise he characterized as "the insane act of the administration here." He had not the prophetic vision, the firm faith, the strong optimism of Sir John A. Macdonald.

Of course all this re-acted upon the people of British Columbia. In opposition Mackenzie had waxed eloquent in roundly and soundly condemning the bargain; they could not look forward with any golden anticipations of his entering wholesomely into an effort to carry it through. So they protested against the failure to begin the construction within the two years; the fact that the surveys had not yet settled the line of the road seemed of no importance. One would have thought a railroad was like a doll's house that could be picked up and moved from place to place as occasion required. Year by year the surveys went on; between 1871 and 1878, every pass through the Rockies every river course, every inlet, every practicable and impracticable line was examined. Lest one should be tempted to blame Mackenzie overmuch for this leisurely examination let us take a glance at the local politics. The real politics of British Columbia from 1871 to 1901 was Island vs. Mainland. In the final analysis every question was reducible to this term. Had the province been united, instead of torn asunder by this silly local cry, it can scarcely be doubted that the location would have been settled much sooner. This will show in the sequel. The Island felt that Victoria was destined to become the terminus of the transcontinental railway. This underlay the official selection of Esquimalt as the terminus in July, 1871, and the "solemn farce" of turning the first sod; this underlay the Esquimalt & Nanaimo Railway, which, in its original conception was merely the Island portion of the transcontinental railway, extending from Seymour Narrows to Esquimalt; this underlay the war of the routes—Bute Inlet vs. Fraser Valley—the former being synonymous with Island; the latter with Mainland interests. In fact this underlay the conduct of the politicians at every juncture; they all strove to steer through the narrow passage and avoid alike Scylla and Charybdis. It would lead too far afield to point out the specific instances which support this general statement, but any close student of our history will readily discover them.

In the meantime, Mackenzie was striving for a rearrangement of the

terrible railway terms. Mr. J. D. Edgar was sent out to British Columbia to negotiate a modification, but the effort ended in a complete failure. It would be interesting, if we had time, to sketch the course of those discussions and the grand "flare-up" at the end.

British Columbia then determined to lay its grievance, arising out of the Government's failure to begin construction within two years, before the Queen. The Earl of Carnarvon, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, reluctantly accepted the office of arbitrator. Mr. Walkem, the Premier of the Province, afterwards Mr. Justice Walkem, went to England to support and explain the trouble. The award of the Earl is what is known as the Carnarvon Terms, which, in their essence, are the same as those that Mr. Edgar had offered and which had been so ungraciously refused. As these terms were continually under discussion and referred to for over ten years they may be roughly epitomized as follows: The Dominion Government was to build immediately a railroad from Esquimalt to Nanaimo; the surveys for the transcontinental railway were to be vigorously pursued; a transcontinental wagon road and telegraph line were to be at once constructed; when the surveys showed the proper route of the railroad, \$2,000,000 at least per year should be spent in actual construction; and the railway to be completed from the Pacific sea-board to Lake Superior by the 31st December, 1890.

These Carnarvon Terms were, in part, the downfall of the Walkem Government, with its policy of "Fight Ottawa," for that Government had agreed not to allow any alteration in the railway term without the consent of the people; and by carrying the trouble to London they had not succeeded in discomfiting their opponents as the Dominion Government was regarded, nor in getting a solatium in money, nor any peremptory order to Ottawa to proceed instantaneously with construction, but on the other hand had effected a change whereby the time for the completion of the railway had been extended from July 20, 1881 to December 31, 1890. However these Carnarvon Terms had a thorny road to travel and did nobody any good; for when in 1875 Mackenzie introduced a Bill in the Dominion Parliament for the building of the Esquimalt & Nanaimo Railway as provided in the terms it was killed in the Senate. They overthrew the Walkem Government, but did not give the Esquimalt & Nanaimo Railway to British Columbia, nor advance by one minute