

dividuals to take refuge in the concept of having been serving a higher authority. Few would disagree with him in this regard: the employee is as guilty as the employer. By what standard of law, however, could the employee be found *more* guilty than the employer, particularly where the employee did not go beyond the duties and responsibilities of his employment? Given that international law has not condemned or brought sanctions upon the nuclear superpowers, how could it be expected to come down hard upon the employees of those superpowers? At some level of consciousness, the author is aware of this contradiction but he does not really make it explicit. Perhaps that is the reason why he ultimately concludes that any change in the behavior of scientists would have to be brought about by exhortation and by voluntary collective action within scientific organizations. He suggests a UN resolution as one way of nudging the process along.

In focusing on both the moral and the international legal responsibilities of scientists engaged in nuclear weapons production, Weeramantry touches on two extremely broad topics, both of which he is eminently qualified to discuss. Unfortunately neither of these topics is examined in great depth and the book may leave the reader hungry for more substantial material.

The two broad topics are: (1) the method by which international law can be made more effective in dealing with superpowers, and (2) the means by which humanity can decide upon limits to the activities of scientists. These questions may turn out to be pivotal ones which determine both the definition and the survival of humanity. That neither is truly grasped is disappointing.

Leaving aside what the book did not contain, what does it in fact cover? There are four chapters reviewing the history of nuclear weapons, their enormous destructive power and the statistics regarding the "overkill" capacity of the superpowers. We are then offered the three most interesting chapters of the book, wherein the author demonstrates convincingly why nuclear weapons ought to be considered as contrary to international law. These by themselves make the book worth reading.

The remaining three chapters are devoted to the thesis that individual scientists cannot duck responsibility in these matters and that some form of pressure should be applied to those who work on nu-

clear weapons. The author specifically avoids the thorny but fascinating situation where the advance of *knowledge itself* can reasonably be foreseen to imply an increase in the destructive power of humanity. Instead, he limits his focus to those persons actually engaged in weapons manufacture, a term he never really defines. Since he also tacitly admits the impotence of the majority of nations to take effective legal action against the superpowers, we are left, sadly, with much to consider but with little more than moral suasion with which to act.

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That other longest border

by Ronald C. Keith

Sino-Soviet Relations: Re-examining the Prospects for Normalization
by Thomas G. Hart. Brookfield, Vermont: Gower Publishing Company, 1987, 125 pages, US\$38.95.

This kind of topical survey is sorely needed. Professor Hart of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs indicates that there is a "superabundance of published materials" on Sino-Soviet relations, but that there is also a "conceptual fog" as to the determination and negotiability of the issues which have over time been the material of Sino-Soviet relations. The author conducted interviews in Beijing, but he primarily relies on existing primary and secondary sources to establish a historiographical chronology of the issues. The assessment of the contemporary prospects for full normalized relations focuses on the identification of issues as "defunct," "residual" and "current."

The book is topical, given recent confusion over the Chinese conception of "hegemonism," Gorbachev's overtures to the Chinese leadership, the encouraging status of Sino-Soviet border talks and the late January negotiations concerning the withdrawal of Vietnam from Kampuchea in Paris. Hart's inventory of "issues" features the reduction of issues relating to Socialist "bloc relations," Sino-American confrontation, Sino-Soviet ideological tension and

the apparently pedestrian ascendancy of the three geopolitical concerns, "the three obstacles" to Sino-Soviet normalization, namely, Soviet troop levels on the border, the Vietnamese military presence in Kampuchea and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

Hart relates an improvement in the general atmospherics of mutual relations to the passing of ideological disagreements and the expansion of trading and economic agreements. Both regimes are contemporaneously focused on a trouble-free environment conducive to domestic economic growth. However, Hart cautions that the Chinese are totally disinterested in any "special relationship" which might imply broadly conceived Sino-Soviet political coordination.

The analysis presumes significant discontinuity in the changing development of issues, and there is far less attention as to whether there are any continuous factors in the determination of "issues" within the policy-making process. The reader is not explicitly told how issues become "issues." Ideological and geopolitical considerations are placed in opposition. "Hegemonism," which in the Chinese scheme of things is formally derivative of an ideological emphasis on "imperialism" as it relates to the "balance of forces," is discussed in terms of a new conception of security. Perhaps, there is an "issue" in whether or not ideology has been either eliminated or changed in relation to the conceptualization of geopolitical considerations. "United front" against "imperialism" is said to be "defunct," and indeed there is diminished media reference to Mao's "Three Worlds Theory" and a growing focus on "independent foreign policy," but this does not lead automatically to the conclusion that the Chinese leadership is disinterested in "dual tactics" vis-à-vis the two superpowers.

The border issue is highlighted as "the overarching issue of the Brezhnev period," and here there is insufficient reference to American scholarly argument which projected the border issue as a subsidiary reflection of the overall Sino-Soviet relationship. The author concludes that full reconciliation is "unattemptsable" without agreement on the border issue. He expects the Soviets to insist upon Chinese renunciation of their "unequal treaty thesis." He views the Chinese as the "prisoners of decades of nationalistic rhetoric," but he concedes their willingness to move from