

Gambling with nuclear power

By LOIS CORBETT

They are playing a dangerous poker game in Ottawa.

The stakes include risks to the public's health, permanent damage to the country's environment, billions of public dollars, energy self-sufficiency, and world peace.

The pot is a successful nuclear energy industry.

To soothe the constant collectors banging on their door for accountability the government has mumbled that the reactors that Canada exports cannot be used for atom-bomb production. The Canadian nuclear establishment in them has assured the government that it is impractical to make atom bombs from reactor-grade plutonium, and they just pass the reassurance on to the public.


The reassurances, however, are unfounded. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, reactor-grade plutonium can, in fact, be used to make nuclear warheads.

Victor Gilinsky of the NRC disputes the Canadian nuclear industry spokesman's claim. "There is an old notion recently revived in certain quarters that the so-called 'reactor grade' plutonium is not suitable to the manufacture of nuclear weapons...The fact is that reactor-grade plutonium may be used for nuclear weapons at all levels of technical sophistication...Whatever

we might once have thought, we now know that even simple designs, albeit with some uncertainties in yield, can serve as effective, highly powerful weapons—reliably in the kiloton range," says Gilinsky.

The nuclear industry in this country has further misinformed the public concerning the international safeguards agreements designed to prevent the conversion of plutonium from power reactors to nuclear weapons. It is entirely possible for a foreign power to produce the necessary plutonium from CANDU reactors and to make all the warheads they need to complete a nuclear arsenal and break no international agreement. The nation would just have to announce to Canada it was withdrawing from the agreement and its terms, and the government could do nothing to prevent the production of, or the use of, these nuclear weapons.

Not only is the reactor-grade plutonium adaptable to military purposes, with little international safeguards, the CANDU reactor is the best power reactor available on the international market for the conversion to nuclear warheads. The U.S. produces less than half the plutonium with its light-water reactor than the CANDUs. The CANDU also runs on natural uranium, thus eliminating the need for expensive enrichment facilities or dependence on a foreign fuel supplier. It is also possible, due to its unique on-line refuelling, to



push fuel through a CANDU reactor ten times as fast creating assembly-line possibilities for high quality, weapon-grade plutonium.

The potential for diversion of reactor plutonium for

military purposes is not what the federal government or the Canadian nuclear industry would have the public believe. The dealer and the gambler tries to convince the public that there is no

connection between the CANDU reactors sold to Argentina, India, Pakistan, Taiwan, South Korea and Romania and the military

governments controlling each state, with the exception of India, at the time of the sale. The pair tries to forget the nuclear bomb ex-

ploded in India via the CANDU, in May 1974.

The cards are too hot. Labelled the 'element of the Lord of Hell,' plutonium was first produced in 1940. Since

then, the sale of nuclear power to international markets has facilitated the spread of the ability to make nuclear weapons, and the construction of those weapons. Safeguards in-

troduced in 1976 by External Affairs provide no security to world peace, or Canadian responsibility for the extension of the arms race.

To establish a lasting world stability, nuclear proliferation must somehow be controlled. The Canadian government must exercise that control by stopping all CANDU sales abroad. If the

facade about Canada the peace-maker is to lose its comic qualities, serious attempts by the government are necessary - to prevent the drastic repercussions of nuclear weapons and war.

Testing the Cruise

Canada and NATO

By AUDREY BARR and KAREN CINCURAK

To begin, a little information about NATO, (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) such as who is in it, what it does and also what a country has to do to be a member.

After WW II, Western Europe no longer saw Germany as a potential threat and began to unite against the Soviet Union. In March 1948, England, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Treaty - an agreement for mutual defence in the event of outside aggression. Western Europe could no longer depend on its resources and looked to the U.S. for assistance in a policy of collective security. The alliance between Western Europe and the U.S. resulted in the signing of the Atlantic Port in April of 1949. It was a treaty signed by the countries of Brussels Act and Canada, U.S., Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal

and Italy. The major clause of the Atlantic Port stated: "The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."

NATO was established by the Atlantic Port of 1949. NATO is a common defence system with a unified command where each country is compelled to contribute a percentage of its resources. In 1952 Greece and Turkey joined; West Germany in 1955. The U.S. shipped arms to Europe in 1949/50 and American and Canadian troops were permanently stationed in Europe.

Testing of the Cruise in Canada

Here are a few interesting facts concerning the Cruise. It is 6.3 m long and 3.6 m. across (including the stubby wings). It travels 1,110 km/hr and is undetectable on the ground as it is in the air.

In 1983 there was considerable alarm in Canada with regards to testing the Cruise on the Saskatchewan and Alberta border. We were said to have had a choice but if we had not supported it as a country we would have been considered a poor NATO partner. There were 80,000 Canadians demonstrating against it, a clear expression of how we felt about it.

In 1983, Canada and the U.S. defence departments had not decided the precise routing details but probably thought the high arctic was where it would be launched. It would then fly across the NWT and the Northeastern corner of B.C. into Alberta, its flight ending at the huge, barren Primrose Lake Air Weapons testing range straddling the Alberta and

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