

diplomatic mission which would in fact act as a bilateral technical assistance centre between Canada and Ghana.

(b) *Corruption*

33. The government acted smartly to implement the findings of the Jibowu Commission, which found that funds of the Cocoa Marketing Board had been used to support the electoral campaign of the CPP. It may well be found that the system of "dash" (similar to what we have encountered as "baksheesh" in Pakistan) is indigenous to Africa. If so, this should not be taken too tragically; but there may come a point at which, if Nkrumah cannot control it, "dash" might adversely affect the development of technical services and the extent to which private enterprise could operate in Ghana.

34. Finally, in its economic and administrative contexts, we noticed that the Commonwealth appeared to mean a great deal to Ghana. The Ghanaians spoke of it all the time and seem to regard it as natural that its members should help each other. Most people, even quite senior civil servants, regarded the Colombo Plan as a Commonwealth affair and were unaware that non-Commonwealth countries, including the United States, were associated with it. They tended to assume that upon applying, they could become members of the Colombo Plan. When informed that this was restricted to South and South East Asia their reaction was: why not change the name?

*Leading Personalities*

35. Although Ghana is in no sense a Liberia, it is nevertheless true that, as in many underdeveloped countries where democratic institutions are in fledgling form, leadership tends to revolve around personalities. Some notes on some leading personalities may not therefore be out of place.

*Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the Prime Minister*

36. Dr. Nkrumah gives an impression of easy affability bordering at times of diffidence, but one senses beneath this an inflexible purpose. In converse with Europeans, his passionate nationalism appears to be well clothed by the social niceties, and even by a certain absent-mindedness. In the presence of Africans, however (and this was notable at 12.15 a.m. on the night of Independence when he spoke to a hushed crowd of 50,000), his tense, controlled emotionalism has a most profound effect. What is remarkable about Nkrumah is that having created a populist instrument to back up his unshakable conviction that Ghana must be free, he has proceeded at all stages by constitutional methods. At the same time, he treads a tight rope since he is balanced between (a) the left wing malcontents of his own radical party with dreams of communist affiliations, of kicking out western enterprise, and promoting Pan Africanism, and (b) the strong hereditary and elective ties and the semi-feudal attitudes of the paramount chiefs. Taking Nkrumah at his word both in public and in private, one foresees the likelihood that he will pursue a middle-of-the-road socialism at home, will live up to his economic responsibilities, will promote African independence wherever it is possible, and will continue to be oriented towards the West.

*Kojo Botsio, Minister of Trade and Labour*

37. From Nkrumah's autobiography and also from what one saw of the two men in Accra, it would appear that there is a stronger emotional affinity between them than between Nkrumah and Gbedemah. Botsio, who took a post graduate course in education at Oxford, and who has been Nkrumah's constant companion for the past eight years, appears to have imbibed more radicalism in the United Kingdom than Nkrumah did in the United States. He is a strong socialist, a shrewd politician and not averse, one feels, from the possibility of providing circuses, should bread ever be absent.