

as are utterly inconsistent with the idea that Britain recognised any claims of Russia to sovereignty upon this continent. The theory of Canada, as well as of the United States in this matter, appears to be, that far from careless indifference to their retention Britain never had any rights on this part of the continent to surrender ; and that every provision in the treaty to her advantage has been placed there by the generosity of Russia. Even the free navigation of rivers crossing the Russian territory, and which appear to have been reserved to Britain *for ever*, (the only provision of the treaty to which these significant words are applied,) meant only a freedom during Russia's pleasure. This being the case, how can we fitly gage the insolence, the impotent impudence of the demands against which Count Nesselrode so firmly set his face ; and all made under the hypocritical pretense of an appeal to the sense of justice, and a desire to avoid inflicting unnecessary humiliation ! A nation that professes such principles in dealing with its weaker neighbours, shows itself a fit and promising object for spoliation by diplomatic lying.

There appears a difference in attitude regarding the ownership of the islands, the United States takes them as a matter of course, and says nothing about it ; while British and Canadians appear to be under an emotional necessity to make a confession of faith, that these islands were so really and truly Russian before the treaty, that they were completely forgotten—or ignored—“ exactly as though they had never existed.” (*As islands?*) As no particular part of the preliminary correspondence has been cited in support of this contention, it is only reasonable to suppose there are none sufficiently explicit, but the conviction is derived from vague general impressions only.