

in an attempt to play the controlling role in the selection and assessment of HRO human rights personnel. An identifiable DPA human rights operations division would 'warn off' such temptations, and would provide a fixed home for UN expertise in mounting HROs. It would clarify roles within the UN so that other parts of the UN do not duplicate substantive roles in the creation and deployment of HROs.

However, DPA creating a human rights operations division might offend both inter-UN turf sensibilities and result in open opposition from some member states. It might be necessary in the short term for DPA to expand and consolidate its present role without moving to create a formal human rights field operation division. Once more human rights operations have taken place, the practical implications for member states will become more apparent. Many member states probably see HROs and other UN human rights field activities as ill defined and open ended issues that could well rebound and threaten their interests. They need to be reassured that the benefits outweigh the costs.

In light of El Salvador, Haiti, and now Guatemala, one would assume that some Latin American members would give both tacit and for some, active support for increased institutionalization of UN human rights operations. There of course are several states who remain leery of any human rights initiative, but for various reasons they have been prepared to allow the El Salvador, Haiti, and Guatemala operations to go forward. Despite the fact that all those three past HROs took place in rather special situations, there now has been sufficient successful precedence in Latin America so as to increase the likelihood of regional states backing future HROs in the Americas.

The human rights experience of UNTAC in Cambodia was a much more qualified success. And, it is the unique HRO experience in Asia and South-East Asia. As a number of member states from those regions have a rather automatically negative responses to UN human rights initiatives, there is probably a need for some additional and hopefully more obvious HRO successes in their regions before they will readily acquiesce to the further institutionalization of UN HROs.

The African region has undergone a contradictory set of experiences<sup>96</sup>. Although not totally analogous, the UN operations for first Namibia's and then South Africa's transition to democracy were very successful. There were also some human rights components to the UN operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) with qualified successes. Less obvious results have

---

<sup>96</sup> For greater detail on African operations see *Peace-keeping and Human Rights in Africa and Europe* by Andrew Clapham and Meg Henry. There are several unpublished versions, and a shortened version in *Honoring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace*, Aspen Institute, A. Henkin ed., pp.129-160, op.cit. See also *Peace-Keeping and Human Rights*, Amnesty International Jan. 1994