

The FY 1983 request for the chemical programme is \$705 million, with over 70 per cent for defence and 10 per cent for disposal of obsolete chemical weapons. The remainder supports the retaliatory element of the deterrence programme and includes \$30 million for procurement of binary chemical munitions: the 155mm binary artillery projectile, and the Bigeye aerial chemical bomb.

The defensive element of the FY 1983 programme (\$508 million) will improve the quality and quantity of all aspects of chemical defense: training, individual and collective protection, detection and warning, decontamination and medical.

The objective for the retaliatory element of the programme (\$123 million in FY 1983 including the funds for production) is to maintain the safest, smallest chemical munitions stockpile that provides the ability to deny a significant military advantage to any initiator of chemical warfare. We need not, and will not, plan to match the Soviets in agent/munition quantities and types.

The United States will continue to exercise responsible restraint in this area and will make only those improvements necessary to ensure that the United States has a credible and effective deterrent/retaliatory capability.

The binary munitions being developed by the United States contain two non-lethal substances which form the standard nerve gas only when mixed. The considerable safety, security, and logistical advantages that binary weapons offer during the entire life cycle from manufacturing through storage and transportation, to eventual disposal, make binaries the logical choice over unitary munitions for stockpile modernization. Transportation advantages make a strategy of centralized storage and crisis deployment more workable, and there is considerable flexibility in storage and control of the binary components.

Conclusion

The ultimate goal of United States policy is to eliminate the threat of chemical warfare by achieving a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Our programme supports this goal by improving our military posture sufficiently so that the Soviets will perceive they have nothing to gain from such warfare.

It is worth noting that since the end of World War I, all use of toxic chemical weapons has been against unprotected military forces and civilians who could not protect themselves and who had no ability to retaliate. Even in the intense European conflict of World War II following D-Day, Hitler did not use his chemical arsenal. He believed the Allies stood ready to retaliate.

The thrust of all our efforts in this area is to deter the use of chemical weapons, and to give incentive to the Soviet Union to join us in our objective of seeking a complete and verifiable ban on the development, production, and stockpiling of such weapons. If we are successful in achieving this ban, we will be able and eager to terminate the chemical weapons programme at any time.