

to be stationed at some spot in the Gulf to assist in the establishment and maintenance of peaceful conditions in that area. In that connection may I quote—because I think they are of importance, and because I agree with them entirely—a few words from what the United States representative said yesterday on this immediate problem? Mr. Lodge said:

We believe it is essential that units of the United Nations Emergency Force be stationed at the Straits of Tiran in order to achieve there the separation of Egyptian and Israeli land and sea forces. This separation is essential until it is clear that the non-exercise of any claim to belligerent rights has established in practice the peaceful conditions which must govern navigation in waters having such an international interest. All of this, of course, would be without prejudice to any ultimate determination which may be made of any legal questions concerning the Gulf of Aqaba. (A/PV. 645, page 3-5)

That, as I say, is a quotation from Mr. Lodge's statement with which my delegation entirely agrees.

I hope that an agreed solution can be reached along these lines. The alternative, non-agreement, is so threatening to peace and security that we are bound to put forward every effort, with sincerity and determination and good will, to reach an honourable, peaceful and agreed settlement.

The next step in the Assembly would be the introduction of a draft resolution or resolutions: meanwhile the Middle East item was allowed to rest for more than two days while various proposals were informally examined. Broadly, there were two main elements in the many discussions; should there be insistence that the question of withdrawal be dealt with in isolation; and should sanctions be provided in case Israel proved recalcitrant? There were not a few delegations who would answer "yes" to both questions, and more that would be affirmative on the first. The other approach was to attempt by some means to associate with withdrawal some kind of assurances that there would be no return to the unsatisfactory conditions of the past, and thus to promote peace in the area. The Canadian Government, as the statements of its Delegation had made clear, strongly favoured the second alternative.

The debate continued on February 1, and during the course of the day two draft resolutions were circulated. Thus it was proposed that the two aspects of the question—withdrawal and measures intended to produce peaceful conditions—should be treated separately. The first draft resolution (A/3517) was worded as follows:

The General Assembly

Recalling its resolutions 997 (ES-1) of 2 November 1956, 998 (ES-1) and 999 (ES-1) of 4 November 1956, 1002 (ES-1) of 7 November 1956, A/RES/410 of 24 November 1956 and A/RES/453 of 19 January 1957,

1. *Deplores* the non-compliance of Israel to complete its withdrawal behind the Armistice Demarcation Line despite the repeated requests of the General Assembly;

2. *Calls upon* Israel to complete its withdrawal behind the Armistice Demarcation Line without further delay.

The second (A/3518) dealt with steps that should be taken following withdrawal.

The General Assembly

Having received the report of the Secretary-General of 24 January 1957 (A/3512),

Recognizing that withdrawal by Israel must be followed by action which would assure progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions,