

has raised the price of money at the Bank of England from two to six, eight and nine per cent., referring to which the *London Economist* of July or August 13th—we forget which—states :

“It is a *grave question* whether the Bank ought not to have raised the rate of discount on the preceding Thursday, in view of the fact, that they have not, in cash, a third of their liabilities, amounting to £19,913,162, against which of reserve notes and coin only £5,909,245 is held.” “On the whole, therefore, though we would not altogether assert that the Bank has been unduly slow and lax in not already raising the rate of discount, we are sure that they cannot go on long in the state they are, and that, unless they see considerable means of relief very distinctly and clearly, they should at once try again the efficacy of the remedy which has so often been so quick and effectual.”

The *remedy* referred to is to raise the rates of discount which prevents purchases from abroad, until the country secures sufficient from the sources we have above cited, and from sales of stocks on hand, to replenish the coffers of the Banks. As stated by the *Economist*, raising the rates of discount has always proved effectual, and it should have further said, always cripples the whole industry of the people, to cure the evils which their false system of currency puts it into the power of the speculator in foreign productions, or foreign loans, to bring down upon the country. And the *Economist* should have further stated that it was the duty of a wise Legislature to provide a national currency that could and would effectually protect the masses—the whole internal industry of the country—in place of as at present using all their monied resources to protect and sustain the speculators in foreign products and foreign enterprises.

The more immediate point of interest is that adverse balance of trade amounting to \$160,000,000. But it

is easy to be seen that when the Bank, by raising the rates for money, puts an end to speculation in foreign products and to foreign enterprises, that those vast resources referred to soon come in to replenish the Bank's vaults, and what is called Britain's *fixed* standard of value slides down again to a point which no man can calculate upon. When money is high, prices are high; when money gets up to eight, nine, and ten per cent. manufacturers hesitate to produce, for they know by experience that the money will get cheaper, and that the goods manufactured with dear money will have to be sold at a sacrifice. Their operatives are consequently thrown upon short time, or out of employment altogether.

In 1857, the time of the last commercial crisis in Britain, money went up to 10 per cent., yet the Bank failed to find gold to meet its notes, then the government stepped in and, by “*Order in Council*,” made its notes legal tender from the “12th of November, 1857, till twenty-eight days after the next meeting of Parliament.” Such were the effects of and the cure for Britain's last adverse balance of trade.

UNITED STATES BALANCE OF TRADE.

The following from Hunt's Merchant's Magazine for December, 1857, will give a more extended knowledge of the *balance of trade* :

“In 1836 the foreign debt of the country consisted of national and state stocks, or bonds, and a large mercantile debt, for goods imported, the aggregate amount of which has been carefully estimated at about \$200,000,000, on the 1st of October, 1837, at \$232,000,000.”

Then they had a crisis.

“That amount was gradually reduced under the tariff of 1842, to about \$166,000,000.” “For the four years from June 30th, 1851, to June 30th, 1855, our foreign debt increased about \$113,000,000, though we exported \$38,000,000 more coin and bullion than we imported;