

and the Matagne Dynamite Factory, Liège— is to prove that under identical conditions, the various explosives now used in mining, are far from affording the same guarantees of security; to compare them one with another, in order to find out which is the safest and which are unsafe; to determine whether these guarantees persist under the most dangerous conditions; and, lastly, to recommend, to those engaged in mining, an explosive absolutely safe in the most unfavourable cases, where the presence of the others is still necessary, as well as to afford the opportunity, to all interested in the subject, of judging for themselves as to the correctness of the results obtained.

The Products Testing Station was laid down on the plan of that at Neunkirchen, with the modifications dictated by experience, or the desire to reproduce as faithfully as possible the dangers actually encountered in underground workings; and as a study of the part played by coal dust did not enter into the question, but only a comparison of the explosives themselves, it was possible to simplify the arrangements.

The French Fireclamp Commission practically lay down as a principle that, to make absolutely sure of the degree of safety which may be depended upon in a given explosive, it must be tested by explosion in the open air, and under the most favourable conditions for incomplete explosion, because "it may always happen accidentally, through the imprudence or inattention of a miner, or for other cause, that the explosion of substances employed in the mines, and the drinkings may be determined before they are safely charged in the bottom of a shot-hole, and that the danger presented by explosion in the open air is therefore not purely imaginary." The accident which would provoke explosion in the open air "is doubtless very difficult to imagine, but it is not quite impossible, and should be provided against."

These precautions against foreseen objections are not convincing. Given an explosive which requires the violent effect of a detonator to explode, it is difficult to imagine how it can be accidentally exposed to so energetic a shock in underground workings. The French regulations require that explosives be kept in separate bags or boxes, protected from accident. They are to be shut up in boxes, in such a manner that a fall of the roof would be powerless to explode them, the detonators being kept separate from the explosives. The following is the text of the Belgian regulations on the subject:—

Art. 52.—“ Powder, dynamite and detonators must be kept in separate bags or boxes, and must be kept in separate bags or boxes.”

Art. 56—"Up to the time of using them the cartridges and fuses intended for blasting are to be deposited in a safe place, to be chosen by the chief miner."

As to imagine the deliberate use of explosives not charged into a shot-hole, but simply placed on an obstacle to be shattered, where has such a risk ever been at all in the definition of the most ordinary dictates of common sense; where could such waste take place, in any case and under any pretext? If there were reason to fear the explosion of a substance through fall of the roof, measures of safety would be sought rather in requiring a minimum of resistance to shock than a minimum of explosion temperature. In fact, on account of the community and the stability of the conditions, such waste could only take place during explosion in the open air, one can never be sure that a method of incomplete explosion, unforeseen and not tried in experiments calculated to establish the safety of an explosive, may not occur at any time.

One of the constituents of the explosive may (as acknowledged by the French Commission) on account of imperfect mixture, explode separately on the surface of the cartridge, and this element might be that of the two capable of giving out dangerous flames. It should not, however, be assigned a too high value, as it is the only one which is neither the most sensitive, nor the most powerful. It is, therefore, known that they had to deal with a resisting (stable) explosive, might be prudent in the stemming, while the inventors, knowing that their explosive requires a strong tamping in order to act effectually, might go so far as to advise that stemming be performed with the hammer, in defiance of all the theoretical considerations which might be advanced during the stemming.

It is for these reasons that no arrangements have been made at the Produits Testing Station for causing explosions in the open air.

What are the most dangerous conditions of explosion that may be met with in practical mining? To realize something similar in our boiler, says the French Commission, at page 71 of its Report, "in the case of a shell which is not blown out, but under conditions certainly more dangerous than any which may happen in practice, we suspended, so as to be surrounded by firebramp, the explosives enclosed in a metal tube (lead or tin) closed at bottom and open at top. In this tube the explosive rested 5 cm. to 6 cm. (2 in. to 2½ in.) of clay or sand, and was covered by a tamping of clay, sand, or even, in some cases, coal dust, 10 cm. to 12 cm. (4 in. to 4½ in.) thick. The explosion burst, and projected in the state of dust, that portion of the tube where the explosion occurred, the upper and lower portions generally remaining intact at the bottom of the boiler. The nature of the metal, and especially its thickness, might be varied; but no observations have been made in this connection, nor have there any interest in making them, except in the case of explosives which ignite firebramp in the open air.

As the tube burst, the hot gases certainly came more immediately into contact with the surrounding explosive atmosphere than in the case of a shot which does its work; and they are so much the hotter as the energy taken up by the bursting of the tube is less. The tubes used by the French Commission required an expenditure

of dynamic force equal, on an average, to one-third the total energy of the explosive; and the force of shocks in rock is much greater. But the danger of these trifling cases is far from equalling that of a blow-out shot, all the hot gases of which are impelled forward in one direction, and at a high temperature, the work accomplished being insignificant as compared with the total effort of the charge. It is evident that the conditions are in the highest degree dangerous if the shot be blown out while it is being tamped, and still more so if this occur while the charge is being inserted. Several accidents of this kind have happened. A shock, given to the detonator while the shot is being placed in the hole, or while the charge is being withdrawn in the case of a mis-fire, may occasion ignition while the explosive is not covered by any tamping; and these are evidently the most unfavourable circumstances.

turned to reproduce, easily and without danger, an unlimited number of blown shot and it is with this view that the testing station was established in a large open space, surrounded by walls, behind the concrete buildings of pit No. 25, at Flém. The shot-hack was reproduced by a Krupp cannon of crucible mild steel, mea-sured 55 mm. (2 1/4 in.) calibre and 58 cm. (23 in.) deep, the target being 172 mm. (6 3/4 in.) thick, which corresponds with an internal diameter of 50 cm.(20 in.) at the outer length of the breech is 70 cm. (20 in.), leaving 20 cm. (8 in.) for the thickness of steel at the breech end.

20 cm. (8 in.) for the thickness of steel at the breach end, and 12 cm. (5 in.) for the thickness of the boiler at the old land end. The boiler was 15 m. (50 ft.) long, and 1 m. (33 ft.) in diameter, and weighed 100 tons (350 ft. long). One end is open and the other closed, over a length of 30 cm. (12 in.), by a solid mass of masonry in which the cannon is laid parallel with the boiler, but 20 cm. (8 in.) below its centre line. The cannon is pointed slightly upwards so that the issuing flames may strike the roof of the "heating" (boiler) at the end of the gas chamber, which stands at 455 m. (1500 ft.) from the face of the back wall, flush with the masonry. In this way the flames from the mixture of gas and air (which may happen to be not thoroughly mingled) in their most inflammable zones. In order to give greater stability to the "heating" the boiler is sunk 60 cm. (2 ft.) below the ground level; and earth is piled up over the mass of masonry, against which the boiler abuts. Besides, to deaden the effects of recoil, the boiler has been strengthened by connecting it, through the masonry, to the inner back wall of the boiler, projecting by 40 cm. (16 in.) beyond the inner back wall. The apparent length of the "heating" is therefore 10.2 m. (33½ ft.) outside, and 10.6 m. (35 ft.) inside, a trench being made in front of the boiler for taking off the gases and smoke of the explosions. At first, this trench was only 2½ m. long; but gradually its length was increased to 1.9 m. (6 ft.) for the purpose of the transmission of gases. In order to lessen the effects of the end of an explosion, the gases were confined as much as possible, while the vacillation of the accompanying flames were facilitated.

or the accompanying names were eradicated. The boiler is 15 ft. in diameter, has 1573 cubic meters (625 cubic feet) of water, and an impermeable screen stretched transversely 4.55 m. (15 ft.) from the end, serves to isolate from the shot a gas chamber of 8 cubic meters (282½ cubic feet) capacity. The working of the apparatus is very simple, the operation being accomplished in less than a minute. At the right distance a double-channel iron hoop is riveted inside the circumference of the "herding," forming a groove of about 2 cm. (¾ in.). A shot of iron, soaked in greasing, the edges of which are bent into a "hook," is fired. The shot is elastic because the latter being short enough for its tension to ensure tightness of the joint. The seam between the channeled iron and the boiler was also rendered tight by caulking with hemp and red lead, or with metallic lead.

For the explosive gas, lightning gas was used, the apparatus being placed in communication with the gas main supplying the surface buildings of the colliery. A meter in the pipe permits of rapidly introducing the desired proportion of gas; and the gas pipe terminates at a line with the cannon and 50 cm. (1 ft. 8 in.) in front of it. To effect a mixture of the gas and air, an agitator is suspended from the roof of the headings, being worked from the outside of a copper wire, the edges of the hole through the roof being pasted with mud. This agitator is sufficient for the object in view, although it may happen sometimes that the mixture is not quite homogeneous. To exactly fulfil the conditions which occur in practice, it would have been better to have experimented with natural fire damp; but when this cannot be obtained the author sees no reason why *formene* should be employed, as fire-damp is not pure *formene*. Sometimes the hydrogen which it contains makes it more inflammable than *formene*, while, rendered impure by carbonic anhydride and nitrogen, it loses much of its sensitiveness; it is proved that with a lining gas of medium composition, mixtures can be obtained, the possibility of which is not less than that of most samples of fire-damp. Moreover, it has been proved that air containing 10 per cent. of this gas is practically as dangerous as the most explosive.

To introduce dust into the phenomena, two methods were employed. Sometimes form 8 to 10 litres were strewn upon a board within reach of the flame from a shot. The board was hail upon two bricks placed on end, one of its ends resting on the cannon 12 centimetres (5 in.) below the centre line of the hole. With this arrangement the flames only licked the dust near the hole, drove them forward and brought them into a state of suspension in the surrounding atmosphere. Whatever was done and whatever might be the composition and degree of fineness, more or less dust was always floating

in the air; and the finer portions remained permanently suspended in the "heading." At other "times"—for instance, if it was desired to constitute an inflammable atmosphere by the aid of dust—one and without great trouble a rag was hung to the agitator so as to drag up the dust on the board. It should also be noted that the draughts due to the working of the agitator were sufficient to sweep enough dust. Lastly, to clear clouds of dust outside the scope of the agitator a broom was brought into requisition.

Ample measures were taken for observing what passed inside the "heating" and for avoiding any dangerous effects of a gas inflating the assemblage of chambers, which contains a gas-meter and the electric firing apparatus; the charges are prepared. Of course there could be no question of any other than the electrical method of firing, which is the only safe one. The Belgian Friedramp Commission, appointed in 1888, gave preference to induced currents, the sparks which they may produce being easily avoidable, and their drawbacks being less than those of batteries. A static induction machine of Bornhardt or Elner, with Bornhardt detonators, charged with 0.54 gramme of fulminate, were used for firing; and Nobel detonators, containing a gramme of fulminate No. 5, were exploded by a Scala and Ruggieri contact-maker. The results were very satisfactory, and it was possible to ensure complete detonation, even with gric. autite; and it should be remarked that it is not so important that the detonators contain a large charge as that there be a great density of charging, both as regards the intensity of the shock and the degree of safety.

In researches which have hitherto been made as to the properties of explosive mixtures, with or without coal-dust, and of the comparison of various explosives as regards safety, too little attention has been directed to the temperature of the place where the explosion occurs. It is not that there was any doubt as to the influence which this temperature might exert on the explosibility of these mixtures; but no thorough investigations have been made in connection with this subject, so that they still remain in the dark. Gallows, in a study of the influence exerted by climatic conditions on firelamp explosions, has only considered the question of temperature, so far as variations of the thermometer (in the atmosphere at the surface of the colliery) may be repeated in the underground workings, while causing considerable variations of volume, and outbursts of gas similar to those brought about by barometric fluctuations; but, as regards the influence of the temperature of air-currents in the mine itself, there is scarcely any question which has appeared in the literature. It is, however, which has made investigations into mine accidents, and especially as to the danger of explosives, have generally had no other thought than of experimenting under conditions comparable with those of underground workings.

The author remarks that Hall and Clark, in their investigations as to the explosibility of coal dust, arrived at their conclusions only in the case of dry mines at a high temperature. With respect to Sir Frederick Abel's experiments, the author quotes from the report of the English Firedamp Commission as to heating the air, in order to obtain such results as are produced by coal dust in most underground workings where the normal temperature is relatively high. As dry mines are precisely hot mines, and *vice versa*, at any rate generally, he thinks it possible that, in studying the influence of dust on explosions, the effects of dryness of the dust may have been overlooked, in connection with those of the temperature.

Herr Wullmann and Herr Lohmann, in their report on the experiments made at the physical laboratory of the Aix-la-Chapelle University, state that they made no experiments with respect to the relation between the temperature of ignition and the temperature and pressure of the explosive gas. Its easy ignition in contact with large incandescent surfaces leads to the supposition that the temperature of ignition falls, and that of the gas rises, but those authors do not consider that, practically, there is any appreciable connection between these variations. The statistics of the German Commission and its experiments with explosives are not more instructive. Nor has the French Commission on explosives, which determined the critical temperature, the influence of temperature of atmosphere, where a mine shot is fired, upon its inflammability. But it was, in the opinion of the author, during the experiments at Schlebusch, at the manufactory of the Dynamite Actienengesellschaft, that this influence was clearly manifested.

It was at the time when experiments were made for arriving at the best composition for grisoutite. Various mixtures had been compared, with charges varying from 80 to 200 grammes, with-out tamping, or with coldcast tamping, and in mixtures impregnated with coal-oil and containing 0 to 10 per cent. Cent. 66 degrees the temperature of the mixture was 30 degrees Cent. No explosion took place; but at the thirteenth experiment, with a temperature of 35 degrees Cent. (95 degs Fahr.) an explosion occurred. After a great deal of discussion, it was determined to attribute the cause to the temperature. Two more experiments were made at 30 degs., with the same composition, and no explosion ensued. When, however, the temperature was again raised to 35 degs., explosion again occurred. There was no more room for doubt; to avoid a fresh ignition the gases of detonation must be cooled down. In principle it was possible to arrive at this result by charging a portion of volacalisable salt on the top of the explosive; and two experiments were made in this way. The result might be still better attained by increasing the proportion of hydrated salt, incorporated in the explosive, for the same quantity of explosive substances. Thus,