

tion within it. He never
ergy or to-morrow; because
the subjective resolution of
to-morrow—that is, to the one

ect by the subjective act,

mediate and certain; and
the resolution included
included resolution, are

being done, it is because

the subjective resolution
The subjective reso-

ly said to describe about

operations; and it is a

and shall act in a certain

ely and spontaneously in

of those powers of mind

then alike responsive to

resolution to its con-

of the will and its opera-

now proceed to discuss

words, the means and

subjective act. Every

every piece of machin-

It is not, however, the

s between man and the

blind compulsive force;

case, the force is not

resolution or choice, but

ly act and seek its ap-

The Ego is still free

it is the motive most

refuse; for if he were

and this would render

are.

to act in accordance

it is the result of his

resolution in accordance

of motives when the

accordance with the

strong motive with

to a weaker class—

hence him most.

ident of motives.

atory or pacificatory

able, it follows, then,

table or agreeable to

him.* But the peculiarities of what is desirable or agreeable in the subject constitute what is called his disposition; therefore, the subject is always free to resolve in accordance with his disposition.

It is plain, therefore, from the foregoing, that every rational being subjectively resolves from, and through, the impulse of motives. The subjective feeling of consent, apparently the most sovereign of all subjective feelings, is yet the servant of all—we had almost said the most abject slave of all, at least of the dominant majority. The control of all our subjective energies rests in subjective resolution; and the control of all our subjective resolutions rests in the subjective feelings or motives which constitute the primary sources of volition in man's nature; and were these sources withdrawn, all resolution and voluntary energy would be at a standstill. The primary force which hurries the schoolboy whistling along the street—that makes the merchant jump behind his counter in quick response to the calls of customers, or that drags the farmer ploddingly over his harvest field, is a motive or subjective feeling. He may not be able always to tell you exactly what is the motive or feeling; and he may answer in a general way, that he does so because he loves to do it, or because it is his duty, etc.; but he is never surprised by your question, which supposes him to act so from the influence of some motive.

So much, then, for the fact that all subjective resolution is the result of motives. Let us now look more particularly at the character of motives. What are they? Our answer here is, that all motives are simply reducible to those subjective feelings of the Conscience, Heart, Taste, etc., which we discussed at length in an earlier part of this work. It is vain, therefore, to look for a motive outside of them. We have spoken very freely, in the earlier pages, about the action of these subjective senses, their methods of excitement, their impulses, while in a state of activity, upon the resolution or will, towards their appropriate gratification or pacification. It is now our duty, in discussing the will, to look at subjective resolution more immediately in relation to these subjective senses. In discussing these subjective senses, we showed that most of them are attended, while in a state of activity, with certain impulses towards their appropriate gratification or pacification. We now call special attention to the fact, that the impulses of these subjective senses, in a state of activity, constitute what we call motives or springs of action. It is they, and they alone, that influence the subjective resolution or consent in all its decisions.

In fact, there is no other conceivable power by which the subjective resolution of a creature can be influenced rationally. They first act upon the subjective resolution, then the subjective resolution or feeling acts upon the subjective energy, which accomplishes the deed which is to gratify them. There are in all three forces in volition, and they are the first.

People say falsely "that a man in certain cases resolves from habit." Habit is like inertia in matter; it is only a tendency to continue in states. It can never change its state from one of rest to motion, or from one of motion to rest. It cannot set the resolution in motion any more than it can arrest its progress.

Habit gives a tendency to run in old channels, if the impetus is communicated; but it cannot communicate the impetus. The true impetus to resolution or consent is the impulse of these subjective feelings or senses.

A man may be constrained to do a thing by physical force, but that is an act in which his own voluntary powers have nothing to do. If he were impelled by fear, they would have something to do; but in this case the motive would be the subjective sense of fear; and this would harmonize fully with our affirmation, that all motives or springs of action are purely reducible to these subjective senses of the Heart, Conscience, etc., in a state of activity. It is the impulse of these feelings, acting on the Ego, or subject, that excites the subjective feeling of resolution or consent within him, and sets volition in motion.

The impulses of these senses are called motives, when they are thought of in relation to the resolution, but this is a matter of indifference. They might as well be called "impulses on the resolution" as anything else, because it is on the resolution or consent of the Ego that they, as impulses, continually act. When we use the word motive, therefore, we do it simply in conformity with usage, and for convenience, not because it expresses the philosophical ideas more correctly than the word impulse.

There are, however, two distinct uses of the word motive. We may mean by the word

* Some assert that a man is free to resolve even contrary to the strongest motives; because they say, "he is conscious that he is free to do so." In reply to this, we have only to say that he is also conscious that he never actually does so. As parallel to this, we are also conscious that a stone is just as free to move upward as to fall to the ground, were it not that the gravitating force is there to draw it downward. The gravitating force in the resolution are just the motives. We never saw the resolution resist the motives any more than the stone the gravitating force. Neither of them is free, therefore, to resist the gravitating force. Both yield alike with the influence that is strongest to move them. In like manner, man is never free to resolve contrary either to a strong motive when single, or to the strongest class when others oppose them.