

14. Canada is undoubtedly interested in the treatment of these other enemy countries in Europe. Canadians are now serving among the technical personnel of the Allied Commission in Italy and it is not improbable that other Canadians, because of their qualifications, may find themselves on similar bodies in the other countries.

15. The fact that the United States will probably not share in the control of Southeastern Europe might cause the United Kingdom to seek assistance from Canada in that area. Whether or not we provide forces of occupation, Canadian interests in this area are indirect and do not seem to justify the seeking of any share in the direction of policy. Specific Canadian interests can probably be handled by diplomatic representation in one or more of the Balkan and other Eastern European capitals. As for Italy, it was previously decided that Canadian interests did not justify pressing for a Canadian seat on the Advisory Council for Italy, even though substantial Canadian forces were serving in Italy. The question of establishing a Canadian diplomatic mission in Rome in the near future is outside the scope of this paper.

III. UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR EUROPE

16. Earlier British proposals for control machinery in Europe envisaged as the chief political agency a United Nations Commission for Europe with a steering committee of the Great Powers and a council on which other European Allies and the Dominions, if they contributed to occupation, would be represented. For some time little mention has been made of this proposal, although it was accepted as a basis for further discussion at the Moscow Conference a year ago and was included as an appendix to the United Kingdom proposals submitted at the Dumbarton Oaks discussions. It seems likely that little more will be heard of this idea. It is possible however, that when the European Allied Governments are firmly established in their homelands their pressure may make it necessary to develop the European Advisory Commission into a more comprehensive organ. Another possibility which was given some consideration at Dumbarton Oaks was the assumption by the new world organization of authority over the control machinery in Europe.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

1. It is not possible as yet to make more than tentative recommendations on the attitude to be adopted by the Canadian Government towards association with the control machinery in Germany. On the general policy to be pursued no final recommendations have yet been made by the European Advisory Commission, and what is known at present in Ottawa consists chiefly of draft proposals which have been placed before the Commission, supplemented by information from various sources on the attitude taken by the three Governments represented on the Commission. The negotiations, however, have advanced to a point at which it is reasonable to assume that Germany will be placed under three-power military control (with the possible addition of France as a fourth partner), and that other Allied Governments are looked upon as auxiliaries useful chiefly as sources of manpower for the work of control.

2. It is recommended that in any event plans should be made for the establishment of a Canadian mission in Berlin shortly after the defeat of Germany. It will probably be desirable in the first instance for this mission to be headed

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