

3. In spite of the requests for the neutral nations for immediate negotiations on basis accepted by nuclear powers, such a negotiation, if it is to bring agreement, will undoubtedly require time.

4. Soviet Union's statement tabled yesterday states that "It is obvious that fruitful negotiations on the discontinuance of tests cannot repeat not be conducted to the thunder of nuclear explosions." Therefore, if the USA and UK commence nuclear tests there would seem to be no repeat no hope of further negotiations on this subject at this time.

5. At the conclusion of his second statement today, Zorin said that if tests were resumed, those resuming them would have to bear the responsibility for all the unfavourable consequences which could result. This, although obscure, could mean that Soviet Union not repeat not only could stop negotiating on the cessation of nuclear tests, but might possibly withdraw from the general and complete disarmament negotiations. Dean and Godber have respectively stated that USA and UK could not repeat not accept another uncontrolled moratorium.

6. Lall told me that he will be suggesting to Delhi, in view of the effect which resumption of tests would have on negotiations here, that Prime Minister Nehru might wish to consider making representations to the USA. Whether such representations would be effective, or whether representations should also be made by Canada, is probably better judged in the light of knowledge of the American government's attitude in this matter, which is available in Ottawa. As far as we can gather here, nothing has changed the intention to go ahead with tests.

[E.L.M.] BURNS

31.

DEA/50271-M-40

*Note du premier ministre du Royaume-Uni
pour le premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Prime Minister of United Kingdom
to Prime Minister*

TOP SECRET

[London], April 23, 1962

As you will have seen the joint statement about nuclear tests which President Kennedy and I communicated to the Soviet Government on April 9th, and my own letter to Mr. Khrushchev on the following day produced nothing but a long and argumentative reply.²¹ I fear it is plain that the Russians are not willing at present to accept the principle of international verification. In these circumstances I have not thought it right to urge President Kennedy to postpone the series of tests on Christmas Island. The failure of our attempt to make the Russians budge on this vital issue is a great disappointment to us all. But neither the President nor I have given up hope that some agreement will be possible in the long term. For the present, however, the tests on Christmas Island must go forward. No doubt Russian tests will follow soon after.

For technical reasons it is not possible to make a final decision about the precise timing of the tests much in advance. But I would like you to know that I expect that an announcement will be made from Washington on Tuesday night about the timing of the first tests.

[HAROLD MACMILLAN]

²¹ Voir/See *Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963*, Vol. VI (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 44; D.C. Watt, ed., *Documents on International Affairs 1962* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 61, 62-70.