

confidence of Parliament, should be liable to derangement because one constituency, it may be for mere local or temporary considerations, should refuse to re-elect their member, upon his acceptance of office under the Crown. Besides, as the law now stands, it "is singularly inconsistent and capricious in its operation. While the junior Lords of the Treasury and Admiralty vacate their seats by accepting these offices, the rule does not apply to the more important and better paid offices of the Secretaries to these Boards, and of the Under-Secretaries of State, merely because the latter are not technically appointed by the Crown" (a). The limitation of the choice of the Crown, in the first instance—of men who are eligible to be Cabinet Ministers, and heads of the principal public departments—to those who have or can obtain seats in parliament, and who (if they sit in the House of Commons) are sure of re-election, subjects the public service to much inconvenience, and is one of the drawbacks incident to Parliamentary Government: but the evil is seriously aggravated by the existence of the law which compels the immediate vacation of his seat by a member who may accept a ministerial office. Ever since the first introduction of the Reform Bill, in 1831, leading statesmen, for example, Earl

(a) Grey, Parl. Govt. p. 239.