

Even with these issues properly identified and policy direction given, decisions have still to be made on the individual questions that present themselves almost daily in relations between Canada and the United States, questions about trade, about exchanges of energy, about cross-border investment, about industrial policy, about broadcasting policy. And as our study of Canada-United States relations points out, that pursuit of the Third Option "does not seek to distort the realities of the Canada-United States relationship of the fundamental community of interest that lies at the root of it."

When the question of Canadian participation in the International Commission of Control and Supervision in Viet-Nam was first broached, it seemed to me that here was a question on which large sections of the Canadian public were passionately concerned. Many of us had our own points of view, but there were also a large number of peripheral considerations to be taken into account. However, Canada was not itself directly involved in the negotiation and the need for confidentiality was secondary, in my opinion, to the need of keeping the public informed. If people tell you things in confidence, you cannot make them public the next day. But, to the extent that we were dealing with Canadian responses, I decided that at every new turn of events the Canadian public would be kept informed of what had happened and what the Government proposed to do next. I even tried with only partial success I regret to say, to enlighten the Opposition parties by offering them a chance to see for themselves what was going on in Indo-China. Naturally, I was very pleased to see that the general lines we were following commanded a wide measure of approval and this became a source of great comfort to me in making the decisions as they became necessary. Unless we had taken the public into our confidence we should never have known its response.

Among the details of the proposed arrangement, we learned that the anticipated Commission would operate on a rule of unanimity. As the Prime Minister had said on this subject, Canada did not intend to be frustrated by such a rule. It became clear that we would have to find a way of applying our policy of keeping the public informed of the operations of the new Commission when it came into existence. Thus, to try to offset the worst features of the rule of unanimity, we first tried to have the International Commission of Control and Supervision in Viet-Nam act, not as a negotiating body where the rule of confidentiality would be essential, but as an international forum where all the facts and all the points of view of the parties concerned would be placed publicly on the record for all to see. We were not able to persuade our colleagues in the ICCS to go along with this, so we determined that at least Canada's position would be a matter of public record. Accordingly, I instructed the Head of our Delegation that he should, to the best of his ability, see that Canadian positions taken in the Commission were publicly available. This has become known as the "open-mouth policy", to which I have already referred.